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ABSTRACT 
This essay will examine Iran’s nuclear program and foreign and defense policy and how 
these threats shape U.S. defense and foreign policy in the region.  Iran’s advanced 
nuclear program is only one aspect of its goal to reaching regional hegemony in the 
Middle East.  Iran looks to establish itself as a dominant power in the region by 
employing non-military tools such as promoting Shiism and Iranian ideology and 
supporting Arab and non-Arab political leaders and groups friendly toward Iran.  
Meanwhile, the United States and other world powers are concerned about Iran’s 
enrichment program being diverted to develop nuclear weapons, which may further 
destabilize the region.  In addition to maintaining an advanced nuclear program, Iran has 
also taken courses of action to expand its influence and preserve its interests in the 
Middle East by providing direct material support to terrorist groups and developing 
military capabilities that threaten the security of the U.S. and its allies in the region.  
Because of Iran’s destabilizing role in the region, such as its support of terrorist proxy 
groups in Iraq and Syria, and Iran’s development of missile and naval capabilities 
directed at countering the defenses of Israel and U.S.-allied Gulf states, the U.S. may 
have to modify its Middle East policy that reflects Iran's larger and potentially more 
destructive role in the region while also gradually expecting greater burden-sharing from 
its regional partners. 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Islamic Republic of Iran, more commonly referred to as Iran, is a country 
with a unique cultural character, a strong national identity, and a relatively youthful, 
educated population.  These attributes of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its people have 
carried over to the belief, within the political and religious Iranian leadership, that Iran is 
a regional power who desires to project its influence throughout the Middle East.1  
Today, Iran has become a major regional player in the Middle East, as many of the 
region’s issues have included Iran’s involvement to some degree.  Since 3200 BC, Iran 
became the object of repeated interferences by outside tribes and powers, especially in 
the 20th century.  This has strongly affected Iranian perceptions of the outside world as 
unfriendly and hostile.  In 1979, the Iranians deposed the Western-backed Shah, 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and later fought an eight-year war against Iraq that ended in a 
military stalemate and essentially pushed the Islamic Republic towards a defensive 
posture to prevent future foreign interventions.  In the wake of the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution, Iran has attempted to increase its role and influence in the larger Middle East, 
e.g., it has supported various Shiite proxy groups throughout the region and pursued a 
robust nuclear program as a potential deterrent against foreign intervention.  Today, Iran, 
under a theocratic government, seeks not only to occupy a rightful spot in its region but 
also become the leader of the Islamic world, if not a dominant power in the Middle East. 
                                                 
1 For the purposes of this paper, the Middle East will include: Afghanistan, Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Iraq (with its 
autonomous Kurdistan), Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, United 
Arab Emirates, and Yemen. 
2 
Since the overthrow of the Shah of Iran during the 1979 Revolution, Iran has been 
ruled by religious leaders and hard liners on the basis of the revolutionary idea of velayat-
e-faqih.2  Iran’s animosity and distrust toward the United States and the West at large has 
been displayed through public statements by the Iranian leadership as well as official 
policies that challenge America’s strategic interests in the Middle East, such as ensuring 
the security of Israel and U.S. regional allies, protecting the access to regional resources 
and freedom of movement of goods and people, and preventing Iran from militarily 
dominating the region.   
Iran is ethnically and culturally different from most other countries in the Middle 
East.  The majority of its population is Persian3 and believes in Shia Islam.4  As the only 
Shiite state in the region that does not have diplomatic relations with the U.S., Iran has 
traditionally attempted to invigorate Shia populations throughout the Middle East to 
increase Shia influence from the Levant to the Gulf.5  Iran has also used Shia populations 
in the region to develop an Axis of Resistance, which traditionally has included Iran, 
Syria, and Hezbollah, to confront U.S. interests.6    
                                                 
2 Velayat-e-faqih is the viewed relationship between Islam and the state, codified by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, 
Iran’s first Supreme Leader, which states there should be no distinction between religion and government in an Islamic 
state.  Thus, supreme power is handed over to a religious figure and the people must be governed by the “guardianship 
of jurisprudent.” 
3 According to the CIA World Factbook’s most recent estimate, which can be found at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html, Iran’s population is between 90 and 95% 
Shia. 
4 The two main religious camps in the Muslim world are Sunni and Shia Islam.  The distinction between the two 
religions originates from a dispute of who is to succeed the Prophet Mohammed as the leader of the Muslim world after 
his death in 632.  One group of followers, which became known as Shias, believed political succession should be based 
on Mohammed’s bloodline, while another group called Sunnis opposed the view that an Imam (a Muslim religious 
leader) must be blood relatives of the Prophet. 
5 This paper will define the Levant as Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria; and the Gulf states will include Bahrain, 
Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. 
6 Sullivan, Marisa. “Hezbollah in Syria.” Middle East Security Report 19. Institute for the Study of War. Page 9. Apr. 
2014. http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Hezbollah_Sullivan_FINAL.pdf. 
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To maintain its interests and partnerships, the U.S. has deployed military forces 
and hardware to the region, provided military assistance to Middle East partners to 
bolster their defense capabilities against Iranian military assets, and engaged in top-level 
diplomatic dialogue to respond to contingencies and strengthen regional strategic 
relationships.  For instance, the United States has over 35,000 troops in the Gulf region, 
including “more than 10,000 forward-deployed soldiers…along with heavy armor, 
artillery, and attack helicopters, to serve as a theater reserve and a bulwark against 
aggression,” according to former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel.7  Additionally, the 
U.S. military has deployed its most advanced aircraft, including F-22 fighters, advanced 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets, and over 40 naval ships throughout 
the region “to ensure that [the U.S.] can quickly respond to contingencies” and that “no 
target is beyond [America’s] reach.”8  
Iran understands it faces a conventional military disadvantage compared to the 
United States and several of its regional allies that have been supplied with advanced 
weaponry and training for decades from Washington.  In response, Iran has used 
asymmetric capabilities, for instance, supporting terrorist groups and proxy forces and 
building up its naval mines stockpile, to counter this shortcoming.9  These tactics have 
become enablers of destabilization in the region, such as worsening violent sectarianism 
between Sunnis and Shia in areas like Iraq and Syria that present a threat to Middle East 
stability.  Unfortunately for the United States and its regional allies, Iran has had some 
                                                 
7 Parrish, Karen. “Hagel Outlines U.S. Posture, Way Ahead in Middle East.” U.S. Department of Defense. 7 Dec. 2013. 
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=121299. 
8 Ibid. 
9 “Iran’s Naval Forces: From Guerilla Warfare to a Modern Naval Strategy.” Office of Naval Intelligence, USN. Page 
16. Fall 2009. http://www.oni.navy.mil/Intelligence_Community/docs/iran_navy_forces.pdf. 
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success in implementing its destructive and destabilizing influence in parts of the Middle 
East, particularly Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen.   
These unstable, conflict-prone states, which remain recognized as sovereign states 
by the U.S., are part of the regional-wide sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Shia 
Muslims.  The conflict between Sunnis and Shiites has been one root cause of today’s 
instability in the region, as the consolidation of power in Arab governments and state 
weakness has invigorated sects to resort to violence.10  In addition, these states are the 
best examples where Iran has attempted to implement its expansionist policies to 
strengthen its power in the Middle East and counter America’s strategy in the region. 
Iran’s current meddling in the region includes backing the Bashar al-Assad 
dictatorship and Hezbollah’s terrorist activities by transporting supplies and providing 
training in order to preserve Iran’s strategic anchor in the Levant.11  Additionally, 
Tehran’s material support of Shia militias battling U.S. forces and killing Sunnis 
contributed to Iraq’s sectarian conflict and paved the way for greater Sunni dissatisfaction 
and the rise of ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria).12  Iran’s funding of Hezbollah, one 
of the most dangerous global terrorist groups, has also been a part of Tehran’s efforts in 
projecting Iranian force throughout the Middle East.13   
Iranian ideological expansionism, or Iran’s efforts to spread the Islamic 
Republic’s revolutionary values that profess an anti-Western international order, 
                                                 
10 “Independent States in the World.” U.S. Department of State. 30 Dec. 2014. http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/4250.htm. 
11 Fulton, Will, Joseph Holliday, and Sam Wyer. “The Iranian Strategy in Syria.” American Enterprise Institute's 
Critical Threats Project and Institute for the Study of War. Page 6. May 2013. 
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/IranianStrategyinSyria-1MAY.pdf. 
12 Nader, Alireza. “Iran's Role in Iraq: Room for U.S.-Iran Cooperation?” RAND Corporation. Page 3. 2015. 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE151/RAND_PE151.pdf. 
13 Iran’s Destabilizing Role in the Middle East (2014) (statement of Scott Modell to the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee). http://csis.org/files/attachments/ts140716_Modell.pdf. 
5 
threatens American interests, including the security of its regional allies who worry about 
the effects of Iran’s foreign policy spilling over into their borders.   For instance, Iran’s 
support of Hezbollah and Shia factions in Syria to uphold the Assad regime has produced 
refugee crises and deteriorated the security environments in areas like Lebanon and 
Iraq.14   
Therefore, the U.S. should develop a holistic approach with its regional partners 
and prevent Iran from further destabilizing the Middle East.  America’s strategy in the 
Middle East to counter Iran’s disruptive hegemonic ambitions will have to address the 
regional impact of the recent nuclear deal agreed upon between Iran and the world 
powers.  Because of the uncertainty over whether or not Iran’s behavior in the region will 
be less hostile as a result of the nuclear deal, all measures should be taken by the U.S. to 
ensure Iran does not act more volatile in the Middle East and threaten America’s allies 
and interests. 
The Iranian nuclear program began in the 1950s and Iran has been recognized as a 
non-nuclear weapons state since it signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 
1970.15  As a non-nuclear weapons state (NNWS), Iran agreed in 1974 to a 
comprehensive nuclear safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) not to develop nuclear weapons.16                                                     
                                                 
14 Young, William, David Stebbins, Bryan A. Frederick, and Omar Al-Shahery. “Spillover from the Conflict in Syria: 
An Assessment of the Factors That Aid and Impede the Spread of Violence.” RAND Corporation. Pages 27-39. 2014. 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR600/RR609/RAND_RR609.pdf. 
15 The NPT defines a nuclear-weapon state as “one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other 
nuclear explosive device” prior to January 1, 1967.  These states are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States.  However, non-NPT nuclear weapons states include Israel, Pakistan, India, and North Korea. 
16 The IAEA is the United Nations nuclear watchdog responsible for promoting the safe, secure and peaceful use of 
nuclear technologies. 
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From the conception of its nuclear program, Tehran has publicly stated that it 
does not seek nuclear weapons.17  Despite Iran’s rejection to become a nuclear weapons 
state, the unanswered questions regarding Iran’s nuclear past and present activities worry 
the U.S., its Gulf allies, and Israel.  Iran’s determination to acquire nuclear weapons is 
unclear, but it is apparent that Iran has developed advanced nuclear infrastructure that 
raises concerns and presents a significant security threat for America’s allies.   
The United States led the P5+1 (the U.S., Russia, China, the U.K., France, plus 
Germany) in striking a deal with Iran in July 2015, called the Joint Comprehensive Plan 
of Action (JCPOA).  The deal is designed to verify the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear 
program by setting stringent limitations on Iran’s enrichment program to prevent 
weaponization in exchange for sanctions relief from the world powers and the United 
Nations.18  While Iran’s regional behavior is of primary concern,19 Israel and Gulf States 
in the Middle East are still worried about what an advanced Iranian nuclear program and 
a comprehensive nuclear deal will do to the stability in the region.20  As stated by many 
in the Obama administration, the nuclear agreement with Iran aimed only to address the 
concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program and not its other destabilizing activities in the 
Middle East.21  To counter Iran’s destabilizing policies and actions in the Middle East, it 
will not only require the U.S. to provide strategic reassurances to its regional allies to 
                                                 
17 Sinha, Shreeya, and Susan C. Beachy. “Timeline on Iran’s Nuclear Program.” The New York Times. 19 Nov. 2014. 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/11/20/world/middleeast/Iran-nuclear-timeline.html#/#time243_10809. 
18 “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.” European Union External Action. 14 July 2015. 
http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/docs/iran_agreement/iran_joint-comprehensive-plan-of-action_en.pdf. 
19 Sen, Ashish Kumar. “Strange Bedfellows: Saudi Arabia, Israel Oppose Iran Nuclear Deal for Different 
Reasons.” Atlantic Council. 16 Mar. 2015. http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/strange-bedfellows-
saudi-arabia-israel-oppose-iran-nuclear-deal-for-different-reasons. 
20 Katzman, Kenneth. “Iran, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy.” Federation of American Scientists. Congressional 
Research Service. Page 40. 28 May 2015. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL32048.pdf. 
21 Kahl, Colin. Examining Regional Implications Of The Iran Deal. Stimson Center. Washington, DC. 29 July 2015. 
http://www.stimson.org/events/examining-regional-implications-of-the-iran-deal/. 
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demonstrate America’s commitment to regional security, but the U.S. also must 
cooperate with these allies to develop a comprehensive approach that limits Iran’s 
destabilizing posture.22   
Iran’s destabilizing acts, such as its support for terrorist groups, are under the 
order of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, whose revolutionary ideology 
reflects that of the Islamic Republic’s founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.23  
Although the JCPOA may open up future opportunities for better U.S.-Iranian relations, 
there are many skeptics such as Iran’s hard liners, including the Supreme Leader, who see 
the nuclear agreement as focused on the nuclear dilemma only and reject cooperation 
with the U.S. on regional issues.24  Due to past and current distrust between the U.S. and 
Iran, it would have been difficult for either side to push forward the idea of incorporating 
cooperation on other issues into the JCPOA.  Additionally, regional cooperation was 
unlikely because of the U.S. Congress’ “concerns about Iran’s efforts to foment unrest, 
brutal violence and terror have only grown” and members believe Iran will “continue to 
use its nuclear program, and any economic relief, to further destabilize the region.”25 
While Israel has labeled the agreement as a “historic mistake,”26 many of America’s Gulf 
                                                 
22 Iran’s Destabilizing Role in the Middle East (2014) (statement of Scott Modell to the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee). http://csis.org/files/attachments/ts140716_Modell.pdf. 
23 Sadjadpour, Karim. “Reading Khamenei: The World View of Iran's Most Powerful Leader.” Washington D.C. 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Page 3. 2009. 
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/sadjadpour_iran_final2.pdf. 
24 Eqbali, Aresu, and Asa Fitch. “Iran's Ayatollah Ali Khamenei Says Nuclear Deal Won't Change U.S. Ties.” The Wall 
Street Journal. 18 July 2015. http://www.wsj.com/articles/irans-ayatollah-ali-khamenei-says-nuclear-deal-wont-
change-u-s-ties-1437202111. 
25 Fritz, Cory. “Speaker Boehner Statement on Iran Nuclear Talks.” Office of the Speaker of the House. 2 Apr. 2015. 
http://www.speaker.gov/press-release/speaker-boehner-statement-iran-nuclear-talks. 
26 Mitnick, Joshua. “Netanyahu Calls Iran Deal ‘Historic Mistake’” The Wall Street Journal. 14 July 2015. 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/netanyahu-calls-iran-deal-historic-mistake-1436866617. 
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allies have cautiously supported the Iran deal but continue to worry about Iran’s regional 
ambitions.27 
Presently, the U.S. is slowly transitioning to a posture of offshore balancing, a 
grand strategy in a multipolar world whose underlying premise is “that it will become 
increasingly more difficult, dangerous, and costly…to maintain order in, and control 
over, the international political system.”28  For the U.S., acting as an offshore balancer 
relies “on local powers to counter aspiring regional hegemons and keep U.S. military 
forces over the horizon,” but if necessary, “American troops come from offshore to help 
do the job, and then leave once the potential hegemon is checked.”29  Today, Washington 
is relying on Arab states to play a larger role in addressing regional security issues, while 
also putting more focus on its “rebalance to Asia and the Pacific,” according to the 2015 
U.S. National Security Strategy.30  This developing posture is evident through U.S. troop 
withdrawals from Afghanistan and Iraq, and with America primarily providing sea and 
air support to assist its Arab allies in the current crisis in Yemen and the fight against the 
Islamic State.  Offshore balancing should not be mistaken for disengagement, but should 
be supported by additional confidence-building measures from the U.S., such as regular 
high-level political and strategic dialogue with regional allies and additional military 
sales to improve the defense capabilities of Israel and GCC allies.31   
                                                 
27 Gordon, Michael R. “John Kerry Wins Gulf States’ Cautious Support for Iran Deal.” The New York Times. 3 Aug. 
2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/04/world/middleeast/gulf-states-cautiously-support-iran-nuclear-
deal.html?_r=0. 
28 Layne, Christopher. “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy.” International 
Security. 22.1. Page 112. 1997. 
29 Mearsheimer, John J. “Imperial by Design.” The National Interest. Page 18. Jan./Feb. 2011. 
http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0059.pdf. 
30 White House. (2015). National Security Strategy. Page 34. 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy_2.pdf. 
31 Schake, Kori. “Limits of Offshore Balancing.” Foreign Policy. 10 Oct. 2010. 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/10/13/limits-of-offshore-balancing/. 
9 
With U.S. attempts to ensure Iran does not become a nuclear weapons state, to 
defeat ISIS, and promote stability in Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere, the U.S. will require a 
change in strategy that involves the support of its regional allies through additional 
diplomatic and military assistance that incorporates addressing the threatening behavior 
of an Iran with a robust nuclear program.  Additionally, America’s allies will need to 
place more emphasis on strengthening their ability to address the various threats posed by 
Iran toward their security, whether it be enhancing cybersecurity, regional maritime 
security cooperation, or deterring radical Shia factions from exacerbating sectarianism in 
the region.  To weaken the strategic threat posed by Iran and to reconfirm America’s 
commitment to its Middle Eastern allies, the United States should use all elements of 
national power to develop a holistic, cost-effective strategy through the implementation 
of an offshore balance approach coupled with bolstering the defenses of regional allies 
capable of preserving U.S. interests and promoting stability in the world’s most hostile 
region.  
 
  
10 
CHAPTER 1: THE QUARRELSOME HISTORY OF U.S.-IRANIAN RELATIONS 
AND ITS INFLUENCE ON ANTI-AMERICANISM IN IRAN 
 
1953 CIA Coup in Iran  
The U.S.-led operation to overthrow Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad 
Mossadeq is a symbol of Iranian distrust toward the United States.  What led to the coup 
against Mossadeq was his growing popularity among the Iranian people, as he strongly 
advocated for the nationalization of the country’s oil industry as a member of the Iranian 
parliament and then as the prime minister.  For the United Kingdom, this was worrisome. 
Nationalizing the oil industry would endanger the economic profits gained from the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) that it created in 1908.  In 1933, the U.K. and Iran 
agreed to a 60-year concession, which continued the U.K.’s exclusive right to carry out 
oil operations within designated areas in Iran. 
After World War II, nationalism and democracy became important features in 
Iranian politics.  Nationalist feelings led many Iranians to reject foreign control of their 
oil industry, specifically the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company which was vital to Iran’s 
economy.  Britain viewed the AIOC as strategically important in preventing communism 
from spreading to Iran, and as a source of valuable oil revenues.  When the Iranian 
government sought to renegotiate the 1933 Concession Agreement, Britain’s counteroffer 
was deemed inappropriate and rejected by Iran.32  As a result, a bill of Mohammed 
Mossadeq’s passed which nationalized the AIOC’s Iranian assets, while Britain 
prevented oil flow out of Iran in response. Britain claimed in its exchanges with the U.S. 
                                                 
32 “The Oil Nationalization Issue.” Stanford University. Keesing’s Worldwide, LLC. Pages 6-7. 2006. 
http://web.stanford.edu/group/tomzgroup/pmwiki/uploads/3195-1951-07-Keesings-a-OEP.pdf. 
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at the time that Iran was unstable and likely to fall victim to the forces of communism.  
Additionally, the United States feared the only beneficiary of Mossadeq’s policies would 
be the Soviet Union, which “compelled [it]…in planning and executing [Operation 
Ajax].”33  As a result, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), with the help of the British 
Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), sponsored a coup to oust Prime Minister Mossadeq.  
Iranians have always assumed the 1953 coup against the democratically-elected 
prime minister was an American operation.  In 2009, President Barack Obama officially 
recognized America’s role in Operation Ajax during a speech in Cairo, Egypt.34  In 
addition to this acknowledgment, the CIA in August 2013 declassified documents that 
outlined America’s role in the coup, as well as the involvement of the United Kingdom.35 
According to the declassified documents, the objective of the operation was to 
replace the Mossadeq government “with a pro-Western government under the Shah’s 
leadership” using “legal, or quasi-legal, methods.”36  The U.S. felt that Mossadeq was 
incapable of reaching an oil settlement with the United Kingdom and that Iran was in 
danger of falling into the Soviet sphere of influence.  The covert operation, drafted by 
both the U.S. and U.K., primarily included an intensified propaganda effort by creating 
false stories to weaken the Mossadeq government, such as stating that Mossadeq staged 
an illegal coup against General Zahedi (an opponent of Mossadeq and chosen by the CIA 
and SIS to succeed Mossadeq once the coup concluded) and forced the Shah to leave 
                                                 
33 Byrne, Malcolm. “CIA Admits It Was Behind Iran’s Coup.” Foreign Policy. 19 Aug. 2013. 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/19/cia-admits-it-was-behind-irans-coup/. 
34 “Remarks By The President On A New Beginning.” Cairo University. Cairo, Egypt. 4 June 2009. The White House. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-at-Cairo-University-6-04-09. 
35 “CIA Confirms Role in 1953 Iran Coup.” The National Security Archive. George Washington University. 19 Aug. 
2013. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB435/. 
36 “Campaign To Install Pro-Western Government In Iran.” The National Security Archive. George Washington 
University. 21 June 2011. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB435/docs/Doc%202%20-%201954-00-
00%20Summary%20of%20Wilber%20history.pdf. 
12 
Iran.  As a result, the Iranian public was angered by this news and led mass pro-Shah 
protests in Tehran and throughout other provinces.37  After pro-Shah demonstrations and 
disseminating “gray propaganda,” or false information without any identifiable source, 
Mossadeq and his government were forced to flee, allowing General Zahedi to succeed 
Mossadeq and pave way for the Shah to return to power.   
The coup in 1953 has influenced the anti-American, as well as anti-Western, 
sentiment in Iran, including Iranians’ negative perception of American motivations and 
policies toward Iran in applying economic pressure during the nuclear negotiations.38  
While some did support the return of the Shah, America’s role in replacing Mossadeq 
portrayed fear and anxiety among Iranians, which stirred anti-Americanism throughout 
Iran.  As a result of the coup, “the United States ultimately became identified by many 
Iranians as the new imperial force in the country” and religious and hard line ideology 
grew within Iranian politics.39  The coup orchestrated by the U.S. and Britain that ousted 
Mossadeq still remains a major source of grievance for many Iranians and continues to 
give hard liners in Tehran legitimacy to promote their radical ideology that threatens the 
U.S. and its Middle Eastern allies.  Had not the United States played an integral role in 
placing the Shah in power, it is uncertain how Iranian foreign policy and perception of 
the West would have been shaped in the past 35 years. 
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1979 Islamic Revolution 
The 1953 coup produced two decades of dictatorship under the Shah and changed 
and modernized Iran’s society too rapidly for some opponents of the Shah.  The most 
well-known element of the Shah’s regime that was hated by Iranians was his secret 
police, or the Sazeman-e Ettela’at va Amniyat-e Keshvar (SAVAK).  SAVAK was 
created in 1957 with assistance from the CIA and Israel’s Mossad.  The organization was 
designated to crack down on opponents of the Shah using extreme tactics such as torture 
to intimidate the populace.40  Because of the close ties the United States had with the 
Shah, many Iranians viewed SAVAK as inseparable from Western interference in Iran’s 
affairs and the government’s repressive control.  The dissent that arose from the Iranian 
people led to demonstrations supporting Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who was living 
in exile in Paris at the time.  Ayatollah Khomeini was a religious leader in Iran who was 
from Iran for his outspoken opposition to the Shah.  Eventually, Khomeini returned to 
Iran and became the leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, thus, the position of velayat-e 
faqih (guardianship of the jurist) was established in the Iranian constitution. 
Once Khomeini rose to power after the revolution, the United States continued to 
oppose him or his anti-Western ideological revolution.41  Because Khomeini blamed the 
United States for the problems Iranians had endured under the Shah, attitudes and actions 
between these two nations worsened.42  The resentment felt by Iranians during the Shah’s 
reign and after the revolution continues to be present in parts of Iranian society.  As 
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recently as last November, anti-American demonstrations were held on the 35th 
anniversary of the start of the Iran hostage crisis, where chants of “Death to America” 
were heard from the crowds.43   
While the revolutionary ideologies that drove the Shah from power and American 
presence out of Iran are still present in certain aspects of Iranian society today, its overall 
impact expands beyond Iran’s borders.  The Islamic Revolution and the ideologies that 
transpired as a result of the revolution have impacted the Middle East and its current 
environment.  As Dr. Mehrzad Boroujerdi, a professor of political science at Syracuse 
University, said in 2014: 
 “The emergence of Hezbollah in Lebanon, the moral boost provided to 
Shia forces in Iraq, the regional cold war against Saudi Arabia and Israel, 
lending an Islamic flavor to the anti-imperialist, anti-American sentiment 
in the Middle East, and inadvertently widening the Sunni-Shia cleavage, 
are for me the most important by-products of the Iranian revolution.”44   
 
Dr. Boroujerdi accurately lists the enduring impact that the 1979 Revolution had 
on the Middle East.  Hezbollah originated in the Shiite communities in Lebanon who 
took up arms against Israel’s occupation in 1982 to institute an Iranian-style clerical 
regime.  In addition, America’s deployment of U.S. troops to Beirut during the Lebanon 
war to resolve the internal violence was seen by Hezbollah militants as an occupying 
force and later led Hezbollah to attack a U.S. embassy and Marine barracks.45  In Iraq, 
Shiites groups supported by Iran believed America was an imperialist power and killed 
U.S. soldiers during the mid-2000s.  Finally, Iran’s revolutionary ideology from 1979 that 
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promotes Iran as a regional power has labeled the U.S. culture as “a plague or an 
intoxication that alienated Muslims from their roots and identity.”46   
Khomeini’s rise to power and the 1979 Revolution removed the benefits the U.S. 
had enjoyed in Iran during the Shah’s ruling.  Khomeini’s distrust of the U.S. led to his 
decisions to prohibit the U.S. from gathering information on the Soviets within Iran and 
end arms purchases from the U.S., thus depriving the U.S. of a reliable ally who could 
safeguard Western interests in the region.47  In addition to removing American influence 
in Iran after 1979, Khomeini also supported, endorsed, and praised any anti-American 
sentiment, protests, and actions that isolated Iran from the U.S.  Prior to the 1953 coup, 
“many Iranians thought of Americans as friends, [supporters] of the fragile democracy 
they had spent half a century trying to build.”48  U.S. intervention to remove Mossadeq 
ended what Iranians believed was the closest they had ever been to democracy.  Thus, 
anti-Americanism was characterized by “a relatively new identification of American 
power as a force for repression rather than liberation in the Arab [and Persian] world.”49  
Not only did the 1953 coup and 1979 Islamic Revolution spark Iranian hatred toward the 
United States, but as will be discussed in the next section, America’s involvement in 
Iran’s war with Iraq only strengthened the Iranian hard line view that the U.S. seeks to 
destroy the Islamic Republic.  
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Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) 
Following the revolution, additional events transpired that further heightened the 
hostility between Washington and Tehran.  Several of those occurred during the Iran-Iraq 
War, or what Iranians refer to as Imposed War and Holy Defense.  The armed conflict 
between the two nations was one that could not be ignored by the U.S.  Both parties, Iran 
and Iraq, were two important oil producing and exporting nations and their war could 
threaten the free flow of oil to the global market.   
When the U.S. feared imminent defeat for Iraq after Iran repelled Iraqi forces in 
1982, Washington chose to play a greater role in the conflict.  To maintain a balance 
between Iraq and Iran, the United States supplied Saddam Hussein and his forces with 
American arms, technology and intelligence.50  American aid to Iraq prevented Iran from 
winning the war and Washington also viewed an Iraqi loss in the war as “contrary to U.S. 
interests.”51     
Additionally, the lack of U.S. response of Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against 
Iran during the war also did not help the deteriorating relationship between Tehran and 
Washington.  In the 1980s, Saddam and his military forces launched at least ten chemical 
attacks where the Iranian government estimates that more than 60,000 soldiers were 
exposed to mustard gas and nerve agents like sarin and tabun.52  While the United States 
“strongly condemned” Saddam’s use of chemical weapons, the overall response to Iraq’s 
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inhumane military attacks were minute.53  The U.S. and several of its Western partners 
banned the sale to Iraq of precursor chemicals involved in the production of mustard and 
nerve agents, however, more could have been done to demonstrate America’s 
commitment to the prohibition of chemical weapons while alleviating tensions felt 
toward the U.S. from the Iranian population.54  
Another example demonstrating America’s involvement in the conflict happened 
in the so-called Tanker War, which involved “Iraq’s attempts to weaken Iran by 
destroying its ability to use tankers to export oil, and a U.S.-led Western naval presence 
in the Gulf…to ensure the freedom of passage for tankers to Kuwait and the overall 
security of shipping to and from neutral Gulf countries.”55  Although the United States 
first used military force against Iraq in response to its attack on a U.S. radar frigate, the 
USS Stark, a particular event then occurred that forced the U.S. take military action 
against Tehran.  
The incident that ignited deep tensions between the U.S. and Iran during the anti-
shipping campaigns in the Iran-Iraq War was Iran’s mining of the Arabian Gulf.  While 
the USS Samuel B. Roberts was coasting in the Arabian Gulf to maintain freedom of 
navigation, it was struck by a submerged mine deployed by Iran.  In response, the U.S. 
launched Operation Praying Mantis which called for the destruction of two oil platforms 
used by Iran to coordinate attacks on merchant shipping.  When the operation concluded, 
the U.S. had sank an Iranian frigate, disabled another frigate, and destroyed a 147-foot 
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missile patrol boat.56  Essentially, the United States damaged half of the Iranian 
operational naval fleet and, according to Vice Adm. (Ret.) James B Perkins, III, “finished 
the Iranian Navy in the Arabian Gulf.”57  In reviewing Operation Praying Mantis, the 
U.S. achieved its objectives of no U.S. or civilian casualties, no collateral damage, and 
destroying Iranian surveillance, gas/oil, and military platforms.58 
Another provocation between the Islamic Republic and the U.S. that occurred at 
the end of the Iran-Iraq War was when a U.S. Navy warship shot down an Iranian 
commercial airliner killing nearly 300 people.59  The missile cruiser Vincennes, which 
had been exchanging fire with small Iranian ships in the Arabian Gulf, mistaken the 
airliner for what it was believed to be an F-14 and downed the airliner with a surface-to-
air missile.  Although an accident, Tehran was convinced that America’s action was a 
signal that the United States had decided to openly enter the war on Iraq's side.  Two 
months later, the conflict ended with Iraq and Iran agreeing to a U.N. cease-fire.   
The mentioned past events involving engagement between the U.S. and Iran not 
only impacted their relationship during the 20th century, but have also exacerbated the 
geopolitical challenges Washington faces in its relations with Tehran today.  America’s 
interference in Tehran’s politics and its role during the Iran-Iraq War confirmed the 
impression by many Iranians that the U.S. cannot be trusted.  Conversely, Iran’s 
revolutionary ideology that calls for anti-Americanism and Tehran’s support for terrorist 
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groups, who have killed Americans and Coalition forces, have made U.S. leadership 
weary of Iran’s intentions in the Middle East.60  In all, many Iranians remain distrustful 
toward the U.S. because of its interference in Iran’s domestic affairs and animosity 
toward the Iranian people.61  The next section of this chapter will examine other notable 
concerns about Iran’s policies that have impacted U.S.-Iranian relations. 
 
America’s Concerns Over Iran 
 
For decades, Iran has supported terrorism throughout the Middle East, failed to 
live up to its international obligations, limited democracy and freedom within its borders, 
and expanded its missile program that endangers the security of the Middle East and the 
United States by worsening regional crises that prevent long-term stability and U.S. 
interests from being pursued.62  Iran’s support for terrorism has negatively impacted 
America’s strategy in the region by further driving sectarian violence that impedes U.S. 
efforts to help build strong governance in areas like Iraq and Lebanon.  In addition, Iran’s 
sponsorship of terrorism threatens the security of its allies, such as Israel who is in 
constant defense against pro-Iranian terrorist groups like Hezbollah and Hamas and views 
Iran and its proxies as threats.63  As for Iran’s growing ballistic missile arsenal, not only 
does Iran have missiles capable of reaching the borders of U.S. allies, but there is a 
concern that Iran would likely use missiles as a delivery vehicle for nuclear weapons if it 
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chose to develop such weapons.64  Below is a more descriptive outline of the policies of 
Iran that are viewed as threatening to the U.S., its allies, and Middle East security. 
Iran’s Support for Terrorism.  Even as the United States and other nations call 
on Iran to end its relationships with terrorist groups, Iran continues to provide arms, 
money, and other forms of aid to Islamist groups who target the U.S. and its allies.  Iran 
has been a State Sponsor of Terrorism, according to the U.S. State Department, since 
January 19, 1984 for its support for the Lebanon-based militant group Hezbollah.65   
Iran’s support for terrorism has a global reach: from supplying Hezbollah and 
other Shia militant groups to helping uphold the Assad regime in Syria, to assisting 
Houthi rebels in Yemen in their efforts to control Yemen.  It is important to understand 
Iran’s history of continued support for global terrorism, as these groups are used as 
proxies to further Tehran’s objectives and endanger U.S. interests by weakening U.S. 
influence in the region and launching attacks against American regional allies.  In the 
Middle East, Iran heavily relies on terrorist organizations as an asymmetric capability to 
help achieve its objectives in the region without disclosing overt Iranian involvement.  
Iran’s Involvement in Iraq War.  The United States went into Iraq in 2003 
primarily to remove Saddam Hussein from power and liberate the Iraqi people, eliminate 
Iraq’s supposed weapons of mass destruction, and to drive out terrorists who found safe 
harbor in Iraq.66  Additionally, America’s involvement in Iraq led to U.S. troops and 
Iranian soldiers and pro-Iranian Shiite militias in Iraq fighting on the battlefield.  Iran’s 
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involvement grew once the U.S. liberated Iraq, in order to encourage sectarian violence 
and prevent U.S. influence over a country that is a neighbor to Iran.  Shiite militias were 
able to withstand U.S. and Coalition forces during the war in large part due to the help of 
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF).67  
Iran’s Quds Force is a special operations unit of the IRGC responsible for 
extraterritorial operations to protect and export the Islamic Revolution.  The IRGC-QF is 
the Iran’s primary mechanism for cultivating and supporting terrorists abroad.  Following 
the U.S. liberation of Iraq in 2003, the U.S. alleged that Iran aided Shia resistance groups 
and militias in Iraq.  Much of Iranian support for these groups in Iraq came from the 
Quds Force.  According to field reports disclosed by WikiLeaks, which were never 
intended to be made public, Iran was deeply involved in America’s war efforts in Iraq.68 
For instance, Iran and the Quds Forces’ provided Iraqi militias with rockets, 
magnetic bombs that can be attached to the underside of cars, explosively formed 
penetrators (EFPs), and other weapons.  Those include powerful .50-caliber rifles and the 
Misagh-1 surface-to-air missile, which was believed to have downed one American 
helicopter in east Baghdad in July 2007.69  Several of the most active militias who fought 
against American troops and supported by Iran were the Badr Brigade, the armed wing of 
one of Iraq’s most religious Shiite parties whose base is in southern Iraq, and Jaish al-
Mahdi.    
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In addition to the activity by the Quds Force, Hezbollah, Iran’s Lebanese ally, was 
believed to also have trained Iraqi militants in Iran or gave guidance to Iraqi militias who 
fought with Iranian financing and weapons.70  The U.S. has assumed Hezbollah sent 
hundreds of its own fighters into Iraq as part of what it believed to be “the new 
battleground in the fight against the U.S., as claimed by an American Special Operations 
Task Force.”71  Not only was Hezbollah active in Iraq during America’s military 
campaign to secure a stable government in Baghdad, but the Lebanese terrorist group has 
also been known for its attacks on American soldiers and U.S. allies for the past three 
decades.   
Iran and Hezbollah.  Iran sees its relations with Hezbollah as vital to its operations 
throughout the Middle East.  Hezbollah, or “Party of God,” originated in the aftermath of 
Israel's invasion in 1982 and its occupation during Lebanon’s civil war and became a 
Shiite Muslim political group with a militant wing.  With their shared hatred against 
Israel, Iran and Hezbollah have remained closely aligned since the 1980s.   
On October 8, 1997, Hezbollah was named a Foreign Terrorist Organization by 
the State Department.72  As stated before, Hezbollah has been involved in numerous 
terrorist attacks directed at the U.S. that have killed over 300 Americans, including the 
suicide truck bombings of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut in April 1983, the U.S. Marine 
barracks in Beirut in October 1983, and the U.S. Embassy annex in Beirut in September 
1984, the hijacking of TWA 847 in 1985, and the Khobar Towers attack in Saudi Arabia 
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in 1996.73  Hezbollah has partnered closely with the Iranian regime, where Iran has 
invested nearly $200 million annually to support the group’s objectives.74  Iran and the 
strategic threat of Hezbollah seek to exploit unrest in the Middle East to the weaken the 
security of the U.S. and its regional allies, which has served further as a destabilizing 
force within the region by increasing sectarian tensions and conflict. 
Iran’s has led Hezbollah to help Syria’s dictator remain in power, which 
exemplifies the Shia militant group’s role in Iran’s foreign policy.  President Bashar al-
Assad, a strategic ally of Tehran, continues to control the Syrian government, which 
arguably would not be the case if Iran was not providing military and economic aid by 
sending military advisers and giving Syria credit lines in the amount of over $4.6 billion 
since the start of the civil war in Syria.75  Iran has continued to aid Hezbollah in Syria, 
while it sends expeditionary forces with a most recent deployment of 15,000 according to 
a Lebanese source,76 acting as a secondary army for the Assad regime to prevent rebels or 
Sunni terrorist groups from threatening the survival of the regime.77  As one senior 
administration official said, “Iran and Hezbollah have enlisted Alawite, Iraqi, Shia 
militant and terrorist groups to participate in counter-opposition operations in Syria...And 
unfortunately, it’s clear that both Hezbollah and Iran’s involvement in Syria is only 
deepening.”78     
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Hezbollah continues to have a significant presence in Syria, but the group’s true 
base resides in Lebanon, which borders with Israel, Iran’s rival.  According to the State 
Department’s 2013 Country Reports on Terrorism:  
“Since the end of the 2006 Israeli-Hizbollah conflict, Iran has also assisted 
in rearming Hizbollah, in direct violation of UNSCR 1701.  Iran has 
provided hundreds of millions of dollars in support of Hizbollah in 
Lebanon and has trained thousands of its fighters at camps in Iran.  These 
trained fighters often use these skills in support of the Asad regime in 
Syria.”79   
 
Iran, which sees itself as a rising power in the Middle East, has used Hezbollah in 
a manner that has allowed Tehran to indirectly engage in multiple regional arenas.  
Because the U.S. has an interest in the security of Israel, a well-funded Hezbollah 
threatens that goal and enables Iran to project its destabilizing policies in the Levant.   
Iran’s Support for Terrorism in the Gaza Strip.  As with Hezbollah, who also 
provides support to several Palestinian terrorist organizations, Iran’s aid to Palestinian 
terror groups, such as Hamas, the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the Popular Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), poses a national security 
threat to the state of Israel.   
Hamas’ ties to Tehran came to a temporary pause in 2012 due to conflicting 
stances on the Syrian civil war.80  Within the last year, Hamas and the Iranian regime 
have resumed their relations.  During the fighting last summer between Israel and Hamas, 
Iran was found providing military support to the militant wing of the Palestinian 
movement.  In July 2014, the Supreme Leader of Iran stated, “The Muslim world has a 
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duty to arm the Palestinian nation by all means.”81  The battle between the Palestinian 
jihadi group and Israel was seen by the Supreme Leader as another example of Israeli 
aggression against Muslims.   
To support Hamas against the Israeli military, Iran was reported by two senior 
Iranian officials to have supplied missile technology to Hamas for its fight against Israel 
during the 2014 summer.82  The conflict last summer essentially ended in a stalemate, but 
Israel was successful in destroying dozens of underground tunnels used by Hamas to 
attack Israel and smuggle weapons and other goods.  However, this past April 
intelligence reports found Iran sending millions of dollars to Hamas primarily to rebuild 
the network of tunnels destroyed during the Israeli Defense Force’s response to rocket 
attacks launched by Hamas militants from Gaza last summer.83   
Another Palestinian-based terrorist group that the Islamic Republic has been 
known to support is the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).  The PIJ is a relatively small 
Islamic, Palestinian nationalist organization that embraces Islam as a religion and state.  
Although Sunni, like Hamas, the militant group was given inspiration to further its 
mission and goals from revolutionary, theocratic ideals that arose from the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution.   
The PIJ is a direct threat to Israel through its history of suicide bombings and 
rocket attacks aimed at Israel and Iran’s support of the group again questions the regime’s 
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true intentions in regards to nuclear diplomacy.84  According to Jonathan Schanzer, a 
former terrorism finance analyst at the U.S. Treasury Department, Iran’s engagement 
with PIJ leaders “underscores the fact that despite the ongoing diplomacy between Iran 
and the U.S. over its nuclear program,” the “PIJ is now perhaps the most dangerous actor 
in the Gaza Strip in light of the support it receives from the Iranian regime.”85   
Tehran’s support for terrorism is unlikely to decline, as it remains a strategic 
asymmetric capability aimed to project its power in the region.  In addition to the threat 
posed by Iran’s support for terrorism, Iran also poses as a regional concern through its 
missile program which threatens the security of U.S. allies and has the potential to be 
linked to missile-deliverable nuclear weapons if Iran embarked on that path.   
Iran’s Missile Program.  In order for a country to deliver a nuclear weapon to a 
target, it must successfully develop a launch vehicle that can accurately carry a nuclear 
payload.  Iran has agreed to not conduct any activity related to ballistic missiles designed 
to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons until eight years after the JCPOA is 
adopted.86  Nonetheless, the U.S. continues to be worried about the expanding Iranian 
missile program.  Iran’s deployed missile arsenal, the largest in the Middle East, contains 
short and medium-range missiles that threaten Israel and U.S. Gulf allies, but also “are 
capable of reaching Europe” according to President Obama.87  Plus, Iran has conducted 
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multiple successful launches of a two-stage space launch vehicle (SLV) and has also 
revealed a larger two-stage SLV, which could serve as a test bed for developing 
technologies for an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching the United 
States.88  Despite Iran’s inability to strike the U.S. homeland, its ballistic missiles of 
shorter distances, along with its cruise missiles, pose a significant danger to American 
allies in the Middle East.   
Iran’s missile program provides the regime with a wide mix of strategic 
capabilities.  However, there is question to the lethality and accuracy of most of Iran’s 
ballistic missiles, which is likely due to difficulties in acquiring advanced components to 
improve these features.89  At the moment, UN sanctions are being enforced that forbid 
countries from selling missiles or missile technology to Iran.90  However, according to a 
United Nations Security Council draft resolution passed after the nuclear accord was 
agreed upon, countries will be allowed to sell such equipment and technology to Iran five 
years after the adoption of the nuclear deal.”91  Because the utility of Iran’s ballistic 
missiles against Israel and U.S. Gulf allies are limited in accuracy and destructiveness, 
they are unlikely to be decisive in wartime, rather, used as political or psychological 
weapons to terrorize an adversary.   
However, there may be situations where Iran would use its ballistic missiles to 
attack potential enemies, despite their limitedness.  For instance, with its short range 
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missiles, Iran could launch large volleys of shorter-range missiles in order to increase its 
chance of hitting its intended target.  Additionally, as Iran has demonstrated, short range 
missiles can be shipped to Iranian proxy groups to attack U.S. regional allies such as 
Israel.  As Iran improves the efficacy of its short range missiles, it is important for the 
U.S. to provide military and technological assistance in preventing Iran’s short range 
missiles from being used by proxy groups against Israel.  For long range missiles, they 
are able to cover a range that spreads across the Gulf, but Iran has yet to establish the 
reliability or accuracy of these missiles through testing and engineering.92  U.S. 
intelligence has stated Iran has been working toward improving the range and accuracy of 
these missile systems.93  As Iran continues to improve its missile inventory, while also 
incorporating the belief that Iran will now invest more funding into these systems as a 
result of sanctions relief from the JCPOA, the U.S. must strengthen its commitment to the 
security of its Middle East allies to ensure allied defenses trump the missile capabilities 
of Iran and its proxy and terrorist groups. 
 
Conclusion  
The hostility and distrust between the United States and the Islamic Republic of 
Iran has been an ongoing theme for over 35 years.  Despite what Americans read or hear 
in the media, there was a time when Tehran and Washington were close allies.  
Unfortunately, the U.S.-backed Shah became an oppressive ruler who infuriated the 
Iranian populace that led to the Islamic Revolution and the beginning of anti-
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Americanism in the Persian state.  From 1979 to the present day, diplomatic relations 
between both countries have been disrupted, but the U.S. and Iran put forth great efforts 
that ended in reaching an agreement addressing Iran’s nuclear program.  
U.S.-Iranian relations provide background as to why there is hostility between the 
two nations and why implementing a nuclear deal involves more than technical details, 
i.e., trust between both states.  Because of America’s interference in Iranian affairs during 
the 20th century, along with other world powers like the U.K. and Soviet Union, Iran has 
sought ways to deter future foreign intervention through conventional and unconventional 
military means.  As a result, Iran has developed capabilities such as sponsoring terrorist 
groups and increasing its missile stockpile, both of which are factors of destabilization in 
the Middle East.  Addressing the threatening elements of Iran’s foreign policy, as 
outlined in this chapter, is necessary to ensure American interests are preserved in the 
Middle East. 
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CHAPTER 2: CONFLICTING U.S. AND IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY 
OBJECTIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
 
Both the United States and Iran view a strong position in the Middle East as vital 
to achieving their strategic interests in the region.  For Iran, it lives in the Middle East, 
thus, the crises and conflicts that transpire in the region impact its security directly, which 
is why Iran feels its activities of supporting terrorist groups and enhancing conflict to 
destabilize the region are legitimate.  On the other hand, the U.S. seeks stability in the 
Middle East to help develop a region “where democracy takes root and human rights are 
upheld” while combatting the threat of terrorism, ensuring the free flow of energy, and  
dismantling terrorist networks that threaten American lives.94   
To achieve its goals, the U.S. maintains a regional military presence; invests in 
the ability of Israel and Arab partners to deter aggression; and takes actions to reduce the 
underlying causes of conflict in the region.95  The conflict that has spread from the 
Levant to the Arabian Gulf is not directly caused by Iran itself, but Iran has exacerbated 
certain regional crises to garner more influence and power.   
In response to America’s major role in the region, the Islamic Republic has 
pursued policies meant to improve its protection from foreign influence, while providing 
it with opportunities to exert influence across the region.  Thus, regime survival is 
Tehran’s highest priority and acts as a policy motivator, which provides the regime with 
reason to pursue expansionist policies in proliferating its revolutionary ideologies and 
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strengthening its position in the Middle East.96  Iran has taken opportunities to spread and 
sustain its revolutionary, anti-Western ambitions in the Gulf and greater Middle East by 
funding terrorist groups and Shiite militias, while also using soft power by strengthening 
its relations with certain Arab governments in the region.97    
Iran has been productive in using soft power to achieve its hegemonic ambitions 
in the region using sources of Iranian culture, values, and policies.98  The most notable 
example is Tehran’s efforts to become closer with the Iraqi government.  Iran has also 
been engaging in public diplomacy with other Arab nations to develop closer relations 
and to present itself as a better partner than the U.S.   
What is worrisome about Iran’s public diplomacy in the Middle East is that Iran is 
using such efforts to better position itself as the vanguard of a new, just Islamic world.  
Iran’s leadership and the IRGC lead efforts to build political and armed proxy groups, to 
expand Iran’s reach, and build a resistance to the U.S. and Israel.99  Iran sees itself as “a 
model” and “the driving force of the Islamic world,” which requires the absence of 
American influence in the Middle East.100  These ambitious comments seem to be more 
egotistical rather than realistic, as Iranians are not viewed in a positive light by all 
Muslims.  For the past decade or so, Iran has become a greater player in the Middle East; 
from using Hezbollah to spread Iranian ideology in Lebanon and to fight for the survival 
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of the Assad regime, to demonstrating its capability to protect Iraq in the fight against 
ISIS.  The United States has continued to take actions to limit Iran’s influence and power 
in the region, but it will now have to do so by enhancing its cooperation and support with 
regional allies. 
While Iran has taken opportunities to advance its foreign policy goals in the 
Middle East during regional and sectarian conflicts, the U.S. remains on the periphery of 
the struggles in the region.  To deal with Iran and its growing power, cooperation with 
regional allies who have direct links to the root causes of Middle East instability can help 
shape the regional order in a way that limits Tehran’s ability to achieve its expansionist 
policies.  As many of the region’s conflicts have a sectarian root, the United States should 
encourage its allies in the Gulf to condemn sectarian rhetoric that Iran has used to 
increase its power and influence in the Middle East.101   
This chapter will analyze U.S. and Iranian foreign policy in the Middle East and 
how each state’s strategy to achieve its policy objectives conflicts with one another.  In 
particular, Iran has demonstrated its willingness to exert greater influence in four areas of 
the region: Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen.  These four states, which may not be like 
other regional states such as Oman or the United Arab Emirates whose borders are secure 
and governments are stable, are ranked in order of most important to the Iranian regime 
and its strategic interests. 
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U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East 
Traditionally, the United States has had three principal interests in the Middle 
East: to maintain a regional balance of power; to make certain that the flow of oil is not 
interrupted; and to defeat the Islamist terror groups in the region that threaten the security 
of the region, of friends and allies in the region, and for the United States.102  These 
interests continue to influence America’s strategy in the Middle East and will likely 
continue to do so even as the U.S. military footprint lessens in the region.  
One aspect of U.S. policy in the Middle East focuses on denying U.S. regional 
opponents, such as Iran and Syria, the means to undermine U.S. strategic interests in the 
region.  The U.S. has attempted to deny those seeking to weaken its strategy in the 
Middle East by preserving a regional order that favors broader U.S. interests in the 
region, which includes foreign aid to Arab governments friendly to the U.S. and 
safeguarding Israel’s national security through military assistance to bolster Israeli 
defenses. 
The United States has placed strategic importance on the Middle East since the 
Cold War when it was vying for influence in the region against the Soviet Union.  The 
first stark example of U.S. strategic interest in the region was demonstrated by the Nixon 
administration (1969-74).  The Nixon Doctrine marked a new era of U.S. policy in the 
Gulf and led to what was known as the “twin pillar” policy, where the U.S. relied on Iran 
and Saudi Arabia as the two “pillars” to maintain stability and protect America’s interests 
in the region.103  The U.S. implemented this policy primarily through the sale of 
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American military equipment, majority of that being sold to Iran.  Compared to today, 
U.S. interests in the region have not changed, however, Iran is not the Westernized, 
secular, pro-American regional power it was under the Shah. 
Following the Nixon administration, President Carter (1979-81) implemented his 
own policy in the Middle East through what is known as the Carter Doctrine.  In 
President Carter’s 1980 State of the Union Address to Congress he stated, “An attempt by 
any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault 
on the vital interests of the [U.S.], and such an assault will be repelled by any means 
necessary, including military force.”104  Since the Carter administration, the U.S. has 
taken action to assure its interests in the Gulf are protected from not only outside forces, 
but also from internal actors as well.  In relation to the security environment today, the 
U.S. views Iran’s foreign policy as an attempt to control parts of the Gulf region.   
During the Ronald Reagan administration (1981-89), the U.S. was focused on the 
balancing the power between Iran and Iraq.  As stated earlier in this paper, Washington’s 
balance of power strategy favored Iraq, but the U.S. also sided with Iran to achieve 
certain foreign policy objectives such as providing arms in exchange for American 
hostages held by Hezbollah militants in Lebanon.105  Following Reagan, U.S.-Iranian 
relations were stagnant during President George H.W. Bush’s time in office (1989-93).  
In all, the Bush administration’s policy on Iran was shaped by Iraq’s 1990 invasion of 
Kuwait, American hostages held by Iranian allies in Lebanon and a new round of Arab-
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Israeli peace talks.106  As for President Bill Clinton (1993-2001), his Iran policy can be 
described as “dual containment,” which emphasized isolating both Iran and Iraq 
politically, economically, and militarily.107 
When President George W. Bush was in office (2001-09), his foreign policy 
centered on the promotion of democracy worldwide, which included viewing Iran as a 
barrier to that policy.  During his 2002 State of the Union Speech, President George W. 
Bush labeled Iran as part of the “axis of evil,” or states who were threatening the peace of 
the world and developing WMD capabilities.108 
In his 2006 State of the Union, President Bush attempted to reach out to the 
Iranian populace.  He openly addressed part of his speech to Iranians saying, “America 
respects you and we respect your country.  We respect your right to choose your own 
future and win your own freedom.  And our nation hopes one day to be the closest of 
friends with a free and democratic Iran.”109  Unfortunately, the only glimpse of change in 
overturning the theocratic government of Iran was the Green Movement following the 
2009 Iranian presidential elections.110  Many protests took place but ultimately Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad (President of Iran from 2005 to 2013) remained in office and the voice for 
more transparency was drowned out.  President Ahmadinejad was a hard liner in Iranian 
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politics who detested the U.S. and called for the “elimination” of Israel.111  For most of 
the Bush presidency, the U.S. was not directly involved in Iranian affairs, which, in 
addition to A.Q. Khan’s international proliferation network that assisted Iran in the 
development its nuclear infrastructure, resulted in the progression of Iran’s nuclear 
program topped with U.S. and international sanctions on the Iranian economy.       
Once the Obama administration (2009-present) entered the White House, 
President Obama intended on implementing a diplomatic approach to help mend U.S.-
Iranian relations.  Even during his campaigning for the presidency, then-Senator Barack 
Obama promised a new Iran approach by engaging “in aggressive personal 
diplomacy.”112  Once in office, President Obama stated that the United States “wants the 
Islamic Republic of Iran to take its rightful place in the community of nations,” however 
and doing so would require engagement that addresses the concerns the U.S. and 
international community have about Iran.113   
Currently, the Obama administration continues to carry over this dual policy of 
preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons state, while seeking out opportunities 
to strengthen ties between the two nations.  While President Obama remains adamant 
about preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, he has said, “[America’s] 
concerns will remain with respect to…[Iran’s] sponsorship of terrorism, its support for 
proxies who destabilize the Middle East, its threats against America’s friends and 
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allies…We will remain vigilant in countering those actions and standing with our 
allies.”114  
The Islamic Republic has a long history in the region and has now become a more 
influential state that has the opportunity to support or challenge America’s strategy in the 
Gulf.  Today, a majority of Americans (84%) have an unfavorable view of Iran and say 
the development of nuclear weapons by Iran is a “critical threat” (88%).115  These views 
underscore the importance of assuring Iran abides by the recently negotiated JCPOA to 
thaw relations, while also ensuring U.S. interests in the Middle East remain secured.   
 
Iranian Foreign Policy in the Middle East 
The Islamic Republic, a Shiite state, resides in a region dominated by Sunni-
governed nations.  Because Tehran’s religious and revolutionary philosophy is 
contradictory to the ideals of its neighbors, Iran sees itself as an ideological rival with the 
GCC states, particularly Saudi Arabia.116   
Although Iran’s ideal goal is to insert pro-Iranian, Shiite governments across the 
Middle East, however, it is likely that Iran understands the goal may not be attainable.  A 
large majority of the Middle East is Sunni and with there being a deep divide between 
Sunni and Shiite Muslims, along with the fear of Iranian regional hegemony, it will be 
difficult for Tehran to successfully influence Shiite populations that leads to additional 
pro-Iranian Shiite governments in Sunni Arab states.  In addition, the U.S. has sought to 
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maintain a balance of power among the Middle East countries where no one country has 
the military capabilities to dominate all the other states, but more importantly ensuring 
that its Arab allies and Israel maintain a stronger position militarily and geopolitically to 
counter Iran’s aggressive and threatening posture.  Despite these challenges, Iran has 
shown successes in broadening its influence in certain parts of the Middle East such as 
Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, which will be discussed later in this chapter.   
Because of the challenges to Iran’s expansionist policies posed by the United 
States and its Gulf partners, Iran’s Middle East policy is reactive and flexible, where Iran 
seeks to further its influence in response to a crisis to achieve its regional goals.117  If 
opportunities arise for Tehran to exert its influence through political, economic, or 
military means, then recent history has shown Iran’s ability to do so with relative 
effectiveness.  Two examples of Iran’s willingness to exploit its foreign policy goals from 
regional crises include the Syrian civil war and the current fight against ISIS in Iraq and 
Syria.  In Syria, Iran has strengthened its strategic partnership with the Assad 
government, who allows Iran to use Syria as a conduit to fund and arm Hezbollah in 
Lebanon and Islamist groups in Palestine.  As for Iraq, the battle against ISIS has enabled 
Tehran to become closer with the government in Baghdad, while supporting Shiite 
factions to further sectarian violence in Iraq.   
In addition to the U.S., there are Sunni Arabs who see these and other actions by 
Tehran as steps toward Iran’s goal of dominating the Middle East.  For instance, there 
were those in Iraq and neighboring Jordan who feared that Iran was trying to influence 
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the 2005 Iraqi elections to create an Islamic government that would dramatically shift the 
geopolitical balance between Shiite and Sunni Muslims in the Middle East.  Jordanian 
King Abdullah worried that, “If Iraq goes Islamic republic, then, yes, we've opened 
ourselves to a whole set of new problems that will not be limited to the borders of 
Iraq.”118  More specifically, King Abdullah, along with other Sunni Arab elites, feared 
that Iran’s presence in the Iraqi elections would lead to what is referred to as the Shiite 
crescent; the idea that Iran will engage the masses in the region, build an ideological belt 
of sympathetic Shiite governments and political factions in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and the 
Gulf region, and then expand its regional role and influence.119  While Iran has an interest 
in building support among the populaces in all parts of the Middle East, this paper will 
examine how Iranian and U.S. policy differ in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, areas 
where Iran views as most strategically vital to reaching its regional ambitions. 
 
Iraq 
The United States and Iran have both invested a great deal of time and resources 
to maintain influence over the Iraqi government and population.  For the United States, it 
has been heavily involved in Iraq since the end of the Cold War and still remains 
committed to the country’s stability.  Iran, who saw Iraq as a security threat until Saddam 
was no longer in power, has also been active in strengthening its influence in Iraq.  In 
post-Saddam Iraq, Tehran has worked to become an ally of Iraq’s government, led by a 
Shiite prime minister, as well as project its influence within the local Shiite populations 
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in Iraq.  After the United States’ withdrawal of combat troops from Iraq in December 
2011, Washington has primarily used soft power to project influence in Iraq to help 
Baghdad sustain its security and internal stability.  Soft power, as described by Dr. 
Joseph Nye of Harvard University, is “the ability to get what you want through attraction 
rather than coercion or payments,” which includes shaping the attitudes and preferences 
of others.120  The Strategic Framework Agreement signed in 2008 between the U.S. and 
Iraq outlined a strategy focused on U.S. soft power by having both sides commit to a 
long-term relationship that would “contribute to the strengthening and development of 
democracy in Iraq, as well as ensuring that Iraq will assume full responsibility for its 
security, the safety of its people, and maintaining peace within Iraq and among the 
countries of the region.”121   
Another example of U.S. soft power is EducationUSA, a free service providing 
interested Iraqi students with information about how to apply to U.S. colleges and 
universities, which reached an all-time high in 2014 in the number of Iraqi students 
studying in the U.S.122  Since the re-emergence of the Islamic State in early 2014, 
formerly known as the al Qaeda in Iraq after the U.S. went into Iraq in 2003, the United 
States has been implementing more military-based tactics to support Iraqi forces in 
countering the advances of ISIS militants. 
The United States has several core interests in Iraq.  These interests, which were 
also put forth in the Strategic Framework Agreement, align with American values and 
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look to improve the security situation in the Middle East.  As stated by Brett McGurk, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Iraq and Iran in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, 
during a 2013 hearing in front of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, 
U.S. policy toward Iraq includes: 
1. Maintaining a unified and federal Iraq; 
2. Supporting increases in production and export of oil resources; 
3. Promoting Iraq’s strategic independence and regional integration; 
4. Countering the re-emergence of al Qaida in Iraq (AQI), and; 
5. Supporting Iraq’s democratic institutions and trajectory.123  
These goals remain applicable to Iraq today, however, the fourth goal is now 
focused on efforts to “degrade and ultimately destroy” ISIS.124  The success of each of 
these goals heavily depends on one another.  For example, defeating the Islamic State 
will require Iraq to become more unified through the establishment of democratic 
institutions that represent all sects of the Iraqi people.   
Iraq is over three-quarters Arab with the rest of the population consisting of 
Kurds, and the religious divide being nearly three Shiites for every one Sunni.125  Even 
after the removal of Saddam, tensions between Sunnis and Shiites have continued.  The 
United States has chosen to support all factions in Iraq, however, Iran clearly aligns itself 
with Shiites in Iraq which has increased the potential for future sectarian violence after 
ISIS is defeated and expelled from Iraq.  Iran’s efforts to counter ISIS in Iraq have been 
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viewed both as a concern, but also a potential benefit.  In a Senate Armed Services 
Committee in March 2015, Joint Chief of Staff Gen. Martin Dempsey said Tehran’s role 
in aiding pro-Iranian Shiites could be “a positive thing,” although he and Secretary of 
Defense Ashton Carter spoke of their concerns that Iran’s actions could worsen 
sectarianism in Iraq.126  Iranian involvement in the fight against ISIS in Iraq is a clear 
indication about the worries the U.S. has about Tehran strengthening Shiite groups in 
order to gain control of Sunni-populated regions across Iraq. 
Since the United States removed Saddam from power, Iran has sought to ensure 
that Iraq does not again present a military threat to Iranians as it did for decades prior to 
2003.  When evaluating Iran’s policy toward Iraq, Iran’s two strategic objectives have 
been “to help the formation of an Iranian-friendly government in Baghdad, and second, to 
prevent the country from regaining the military clout of the Ba‘athist era or serving as a 
launching pad for possible U.S. or Israeli military strikes.”127  Both of these objectives 
coincide with what Iran believes is in its foreign policy interests.  What can be seen as a 
third goal, or a means to achieving greater influence in Baghdad, is stopping the military 
campaign by the Islamic State.  In pursuit of these objectives, Iran has continued to 
promote sectarian politics, while ensuring that Western influences do not dominate Iran’s 
strategy in influencing Iraqi political affairs.  
According to some experts, such as former Ambassador Ryan Crocker, Iran’s 
meddling in Iraq is part of a three-state partition strategy where Iran could influence 
Kurds in the north to align with Tehran, implement a puppet regime in a “Shiastan” in the 
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south, and then use a central state populated with radical Sunnis as a tool to warrant the 
sending in of their radical Shia militias, precisely to foster this permanent rupture of the 
unitary Iraqi state.128  In the view of the Iranian leadership, a divided Iraqi government 
favors Iran’s interests and allows Tehran to exert its influence on its Arab neighbor.  Iran 
favors an Iraq with a Shia-majority leadership, and to achieve that goal, Iran has pursued 
sectarian strategies to promote unity among Iraq’s Shia political groups; including 
funding Shia parties, encouraging them to run as a single coalition during past elections, 
influencing sectarian identity politics, and advocating a political process polarized along 
sectarian lines.129   
Iran welcomed and supported former Shia Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his 
new government in 2006, most likely to grow close to the new Iraqi leader.  In a post-
Saddam Iraq, Iran saw an opportunity to transform the Iraqi political system to one that 
would befriend Tehran.  To some extent, one can state that Maliki accepted its close ties 
with the Islamic Republic to help him and his coalition maintain power in Iraq.  In 
addition, Maliki supported many of Iran’s goals in the Middle East.   
For instance, while in power, the Maliki government played a part in assisting 
Iran in its support for the Assad government in Syria.  Maliki allowed Iran to use Iraqi 
airspace to send military equipment to Syria to help strengthen Assad’s forces during his 
country’s ongoing civil war.130  This issue was addressed again by the United States 
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during newly-appointed Secretary of State John Kerry’s first trip to Iraq, since the U.S. 
knew Iraq continued to assist Iranian efforts to arm the Assad regime.131  Also, Iraq has 
been reluctant to enforce stringent rules relating to international sanctions placed on Iran 
for its clandestine nuclear program activity. 
As reported by the New York Times in 2012, the United States acknowledged that 
Iraqi officials, some of whom where close to Prime Minister Maliki, turned a blind eye in 
allowing Iraq to be a network of financial institutions and oil-smuggling operations that 
were providing Tehran with a crucial flow of dollars.132  One entity that helped Iran’s 
ability to circumvent sanctions was the Elaf Islamic Bank in Iraq.  The Elaf Islamic Bank 
would participate in the Iraq Central Bank’s daily auction where commercial banks could 
sell Iraqi dinars and buy U.S. dollars.  Through these auctions, customers of Iran were 
able to move large amounts of cash from there into banks in regional financial centers 
such as Dubai, United Arab Emirates, or Amman, Jordan, and then into the international 
banking system.  These types of transactions were “worth tens of millions of dollars with 
the Export Development Bank of Iran” from 2011-12, according to the United States 
Treasury Department.133   
In May 2013 the United States lifted its sanctions134 from the Iraqi bank, as the 
bank ended its actions that were violations under the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
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Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010.135  Although some progress has been made 
to stop Iraq’s assistance to help Tehran circumvent sanctions, it can be clearly seen that 
Iraq has been used as a loophole for the Iranian regime to pursue its destabilizing 
policies. 
Since Iranian President Hassan Rouhani entered into office in August 2013, 
Tehran has looked to strengthen its relations with Baghdad.  Rouhani, viewed by some as 
more pragmatic than his predecessor, has taken efforts to engage with Iraqi leaders.  
Within a month after the Joint Plan of Action was agreed upon between the world powers 
and Iran, then-Prime Minister Maliki visited Tehran in December 2013.  As described by 
Rouhani’s website, the Iranian president “described Tehran’s ties with neighboring Iraq 
as strategic, calling for long-term development of mutual ties in all fields.”136   
In today’s international fight against the Islamic State, Iran has become a key 
partner for the Iraqi government to protect key Iraqi cities and strategic points.  When 
Iraqi security forces fled after ISIS militants entered Iraq to capture several large cities 
last summer, Iran was one of the first nations to send support to Baghdad.137  ISIS is also 
a threat for Iran, as an unstable Iraq dominated by ISIS and other Sunni Islamists would 
be a major security concern for Iran.   
The threat of the Islamic State and its advancements in Iraq have warranted Iran’s 
increasing role in helping protect Baghdad.  Soon after the second-largest Iraqi city of 
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Mosul fell to ISIS fighters in early June 2014, Iran deployed units from its Revolutionary 
Guard Corps to Iraq.138  According to Iranian security officials, two units were dispatched 
from Iran's western border provinces and tasked with protecting Baghdad and the holy 
Shiite cities of Karbala and Naja.139   
Although the United States also has played an integral role in helping Iraq push 
back ISIS fighters, there are Iraqi officials who feel the U.S. could have assisted sooner.  
According to General Qassem Atta, head of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service, 
“From the first day we sent a request to the Americans for training and weapons…The 
U.S. excuse for not sending it [help] was to wait for the new government to be 
established.  We had no choice...but to go to Iran.  We had to defend ourselves.”140 
Since June of last year, Iran has provided additional military support through 
training Shiite factions supported by Baghdad, weapons shipments from Iran, and actual 
air strikes to counter the advancements of ISIS fighters.  According to one Iraqi 
government official, Tehran has sold Iraq nearly $10 billion worth of weapons and 
hardware, mostly weapons for urban warfare like assault rifles, heavy machine-guns and 
rocket launchers.141  Iranian military assistance to Iraqi forces has been helpful in 
allowing the Iraqi military to regain some strength and attempt to fight back ISIS, which 
is required if Iraq hopes to recapture the territory once lost to the militants.  Even 
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Chairman Gen. Martin Dempsey believes Iran’s support in Iraq to fight ISIS is fine and 
that “it will only be a problem if it results in sectarianism.”142      
Not only has Iran provided direct support to the Iraqi government and its security 
forces, but Iran’s assistance to Shiite militias in Iraq has been crucial to thwarting the 
efforts of the Islamic State in Iraq.  Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, an Iraqi cleric, last 
summer called on Iraqi citizens who were “able to bear arms and fight terrorists, 
defending their country and their people and their holy places” to “volunteer and join the 
security forces to achieve this holy purpose.”143  As a result, the Popular Mobilization 
Forces (PMF), as they are known, were formed which include a number of Shiite militias 
directly supported by Iran.      
These militias that are enabling the government of Iraq to push back ISIS also 
include fighters who attacked and killed U.S. troops during the invasion of Iraq a decade 
ago.  Although the security of Iraq is an objective for the United States, there is a worry 
that the growing clout of the militias will cause sectarian violence in an Iraqi controlled 
mostly by Shiites after the Islamic State is defeated.  In essence, Iraq would become 
similar to what Lebanon is today, a weak government heavily controlled by a pro-Iranian 
Shiite movement.   
With the Shiite militias gaining momentum in Iraq, which has been aided by 
airstrikes from the U.S. and its international partners, some militia leaders do not feel the 
need for the U.S. to assist in the fight against the Islamic State.  Many analysts believe 
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that the Shiite militias “don’t want the Americans there and they never did,” which 
displays the growing role of Iran inside Iraq.144  These Iraqi militias have close ties to 
Iran and believe that Iranian support is only needed to defeat ISIS.  As Karim al-Nouri, 
spokesman and military commander for the Badr Organization, one of the most dominant 
Shiite militias in Iraq, said, “We don’t need [the U.S.], either on the ground or in the 
air…We can defeat the Islamic State on our own.”145  
While the rise of the Islamic State has required military support from the U.S. and 
Iran, it has also invigorated Iranian influence in Iraq in two ways.  The first being that the 
ISIS threat has mobilized the Iraqi Shiite community, which has allowed Iran to take 
advantage of an opportunity to reintegrate its influence in Iraq.  Secondly, the Islamic 
State’s advancements have allowed Iranian advisers to manage Shiite militias in Iraq and 
to some extent Iraqi military forces.  In all, Iran has taken advantage of a regional crisis 
to further its expansionist goals in the Middle East by increasing its footprint in Iraq and 
demonstrating its ability to assist Iraqis in preserving their security.   
However, it must be mentioned that not all those in Iraq support Iran’s growing 
influence and their regional ambitions throughout the Middle East.  For instance, there 
are Shiites in Iraq who do not support Iranian concepts such as an Islamic revolution or a 
religious Supreme Leader as a nation’s top decision-maker.146  In addition, Iraqi Sunnis 
tend to view Iranian influence in their country negatively, as they fear Iran’s increasing 
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involvement in Iraq will foster Shiite groups to seek control of Sunni-majority towns.147  
The Popular Mobilization Forces, filled with pro-Iranian Shiites, are assisting Sunni 
towns by driving back ISIS fighters, however, there have been many instances where 
these Shiites militias have then committed war crimes against Iraqi Sunnis in revenge of 
ISIS attacks on Shiites.148   
Additionally, many Iraqi Kurds are not supportive of the pro-Iranian Shiite 
militias’ role in fighting the Islamic State.  Kurdish fighters have fought alongside with 
the Popular Mobilization Forces, although their alliance has been uneasy as the Kurds 
feel the Shiites will contest with them for control over northern Iraq.149  The Kurds are 
worried that Shiite militias will look to control northern Iraqi cities, like Kirkuk, after 
they have been liberated from ISIS control.  This negative perception of the PMF, 
whether or not they are backed by Iran, can become a source of increasing sectarian 
violence that may lead to a civil war within Iraq once the ISIS threat has diminished.   
The future of U.S. and Iranian policy in Iraq may be shaped by what happens with 
the ISIS threat and how much each state will commit to establishing a stronger internal 
security force to protect Iraqis.  ISIS is unlikely to be either destroyed or pushed out of 
Iraq anytime soon, thus the United States and Iran will continue their military support to 
Baghdad.  For the near-term, it seems likely the U.S. will extend its military assistance 
through the administration’s current plan of airstrikes targeting ISIS and training Iraqi 
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forces.150  In concert, Iran has pursued a stronger security relationship with Iraq over the 
past year, but also has used the Islamic State crisis to strengthen Shiite factions in Iraq.    
Tehran has continued to maintain closer relations with Baghdad, one example 
being a military pact signed between the two states at the end of 2014.  The agreement 
will allow Iran to continue to train Iraqi units in the fight against the Islamic State.  
According to Iraqi Defense Minister Khalid al-Obeidi, Iraq assumes “Iran’s increased 
support for the Iraqi armed forces as a strategic necessity.”151  The success of the Iranian-
backed Shiite militias in Iraq, along with the cultural ties between Tehran and Baghdad, 
have allowed Iran to implant itself into a stronger role to influence the future of Iraq.   
Even if Iraq and Iran become closer allies as a result of the fight against ISIS, this 
is not to say the United States will no longer be relevant to Iraq.  In major security crises 
like the one with the Islamic State, Iraq will likely ask for U.S. assistance as its military 
capabilities far surpass those of Iran.  Thus, an American role in Iraq’s future security 
will unlikely enable Iran to form an ideal government in Baghdad that rejects the United 
States.  Iran has settled in knowing that Iraqi leadership will rely on the U.S. in certain 
scenarios, but Iran has built itself to be a strategic partner to influence policy in Baghdad.   
In order for the United States to achieve its goals in Iraq and prevent Iran from 
reducing American influence in Baghdad, it will have to take necessary steps to build an 
enduring strategic partnership with Iraq that displays its commitment to Iraq’s long-term 
stability and security.  Developing a strategy built with transparency, integrity, and 
content can allow the U.S. to counter Iranian influence in Iraq through assisting the Iraqi 
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forces in fighting against ISIS and helping Iraq to becoming an independent state.152  
Several actions include arming and training Sunni tribal forces to fight against ISIS 
militants,153 while also strengthening United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) programs aimed at helping Iraqis improve the effectiveness of 
their government and civil society.154  Additionally, the use of Foreign Military Financing 
(FMF) and the Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF) to provide training and equipment to 
support the long-term development of the Iraqi Security Forces can also be impactful in 
building internal Iraqi structures capable of defending their homeland without Iranian 
interference and limiting Iran’s influence within Iraq’s security apparatus.155 
 
Syria 
Despite the ongoing civil war that has fostered one of the largest humanitarian 
crises of this generation and allowed multiple militarized Islamist groups to expand their 
territory, Syria is another example of where the U.S. and Iran have policies in the Levant 
where the goals of both sides contradict each another.  Syria has been a strategic ally of 
Iran for over 30 years and remains a critical element of Iran’s goal to shape a favorable 
security situation in Lebanon and along Israel’s northern frontier.  In contrast, the U.S. 
sees an unstable Syria with an illegitimate government who is allied with Iran as a threat 
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to U.S. interests as well as the security of Israel and Arab partners.  Because Iran needs 
Syria to act as “a major conduit for Iranian arms shipments and material support to 
Lebanon’s Hezbollah” and “to influence the situation in Lebanon and in the Arab-Israeli 
arena,” the U.S. has sought to reorient Syria’s role as Iran’s gateway to the Levant.156   
The history of U.S. policy toward Syria prior to the current conflict included 
either confrontation or engagement.  During the Cold War, the United States engaged 
with a hostile Syrian regime as it was viewed geopolitically important to ensure that 
Damascus did not fall under Soviet influence.  The post-Cold War era has included 
engaging with Syria in helping resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, but also confrontation 
where the U.S. labeled Syria as part of the “axis of evil” and sought ways to isolate the 
Assad regime from the international community.  This confrontational approach has led 
to deeper ties between Syria and Iran, as Iran-Syrian relations depend more on the two 
sides’ common strategic threat perceptions, posed by the United States and Israel, rather 
than the Shiite origins of their ruling elites. 
The United States would ideally like to see the removal of the Assad regime and 
its replacement with a more democratic, pro-Western government.  The civil war in 
Syria, although a horrific humanitarian crisis which has created nearly 4 million refugees 
according to a report by the European Commission, has not required the same attention as 
what is happening in Iraq and the nuclear deal with Iran.157  America’s goal in Syria is “to 
provide diplomatic support and a robust training and equipment program to moderate 
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elements of the Syrian opposition” while “enforcing strict economic sanctions against 
Damascus” with international partners.158 
The Obama administration’s approach to Syria currently involves denouncing the 
Assad regime’s brutal crackdown of its citizens and pushing for a stable, democratic 
government through advocating for international consensus on future steps to end the 
Syrian civil war159 and aiding anti-Assad rebels to fight against Islamic extremists and 
Assad’s forces.160  While the United States would like to see the Assad regime be 
removed from power, it seems that goal will require an international response.  Therefore, 
the U.S. has focused most of its current efforts in Syria on airstrikes targeted at the 
Islamic State and other terrorist groups,161 while training Syrian rebels to fight against 
Assad’s military forces and Islamic extremists.162   
The Iranian regime sees Syria as a strategic component of its broader policy in the 
Middle East that contradicts America’s regional strategy.  As stated by Randa Slim, a 
Director at the Middle East Institute, 163 and other academics,164 Iran’s policy in Syria is 
driven by several factors: defending an old ally who has supported Tehran since the 1979 
revolution, preserving a weapons conduit to Hezbollah, fighting against the Sunni anti-
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extremist coalition whose aim is to weaken Iraq and Syria, and preventing the 
establishment of a Sunni or anti-Shiite regime if Assad falls from power.  Particularly 
since the beginning of Syria’s civil war in 2011, Iran has devoted significant financial 
and military assistance to preserve Assad’s power. 
Iran’s relations with Syria today rely on common interests and threats, specifically 
the U.S., its Gulf partners, and Israel.  However, Syria and Iran have had a partnership 
since Iran’s revolution in 1979.  In the 1980s, Syria was the only Arab state to support 
Iran during its eight-year war with Iraq and allowed Iran to send Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard Corps forces to a Syrian-held town in Lebanon to support fledging Shiite militants, 
which was the precursor to Hezbollah, during Israel’s invasion of Lebanon.  While Syria 
does not necessarily provide direct support in protecting the survival of the Iranian 
regime, Assad’s government is helpful in allowing Tehran to further its regional 
ambitions in exchange for Iranian support to protect the leadership in Damascus. 
Since the calls for Assad’s removal from the U.S. and other countries after the 
Syrian protests in 2011, Iran has invested many resources to ensure its strategic ally 
remains in power.  Financially, Iran has granted Syria two lines of credit at a total of $4.6 
billion to help purchase petroleum products and other goods.165  The fuel that Syria is 
able to import allows Assad’s forces to continue fighting against terrorist organizations 
and anti-Assad rebel groups in Syria.   
In addition, Iran and its Lebanese proxy Hezbollah have provided the Assad 
regime with significant military support to fend off Sunni extremists and rebel groups in 
Syria.  While the number of exact fighters sent by Iran to Syria are difficult to determine, 
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it is estimated that at least 100 IRGC members and more than 1,000 Hezbollah fighters 
have been killed in Syria since the civil war began.166  Besides Iran sending its own 
soldiers and proxies to assist Assad, Tehran also helped established the National Defense 
Force, a militia consisting of many Assad loyalists, mainly Alawites (a Shiite sect).167  
Despite U.S. and Gulf states’ efforts to help the Syrian rebels, Iran’s excessive support 
for the Assad regime and its military forces have hampered America’s strategy to assist 
the anti-Assad factions in the Syrian civil war.            
The Iranian regime has been able to exploit its Syrian policy to further its interests 
in the region.  From Iran’s perspective, its strategy has paid off thus far for several 
reasons.  First, Assad, who is arguably the only ally of Iran in the region, is still in power 
and is beholden to Tehran and Hezbollah forces fighting for his survival.  Second, the 
international community has become more focused on the threat of the Islamic State than 
the atrocities occurring in Syria.  For many Gulf states and the U.S., the Islamic State is 
perceived as more of a threat than a dictator who has a waning military and is staying 
afloat with the help of Iran.  In the fall of 2014, President Obama stated in an interview 
that the threat of ISIS is a “more immediate concern” than confronting Syrian Bashar al-
Assad and his regime.168  Finally, Iran’s policy in Syria has led it to gain ground in the 
Golan Heights to threaten Israel.   
The Golan Heights contain both Israelis and Syrians citizens and provides Israel 
with a strategic vantage point that makes Damascus visible.  Syria and Israel have fought 
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over the Golan Heights many times, but what is more worrying for Israel, thus a concern 
for the U.S., is if Iran and Hezbollah gain access to the land.  Israeli Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu spoke of Iran as seeking to open a “third front” against Israel; 
Hezbollah fighters are already north of Israel in Lebanon, Hamas located in Gaza, and 
now Iran directing Hezbollah in the Golan Heights.169  This perceived encirclement is 
viewed as threatening to Israel’s security, as an Iranian success in the Golan Heights 
could provide Tehran with a strategic deterrent against its main enemy in the region. 
For the near-term, is seems Iran will continue to put forth resources to support the 
survival of the Assad regime whose position in power worsens the stability in the Middle 
East by allowing Iran to pursue its hegemonic ideals and threat the security of the Syrian 
people and U.S. allies in the region.  For Iran, there appears to be no alternative to Assad, 
but Iran will likely do what is necessary to ensure Syria remains pro-Iranian and available 
to transport soldiers and weapons to Hezbollah and Palestinian terror groups.   
As could be seen since the start of the Syrian civil war, Iran has exerted a greater 
influential role in shaping the environment in Syria than the U.S.  While the United States 
sees the future of Syria as important in achieving its overarching objectives in the Middle 
East, Iran has been dominant in upholding its allies within Syria to ensure the Assad 
government remains in power.  Recently, the United States has begun its military 
program to train Syrian rebels in Jordan, which had been delayed for almost two 
months.170  However, as stated by Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, the rebels “are 
being trained and equipped to fight ISIL” and not the Assad regime.171   
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Just as in Iraq, Iran has put forth efforts to arm groups to help defeat ISIS fighters, 
while also furthering instability in the Middle East for its own advantage.  It seems Iran is 
also using Syria and the threat of ISIS to its advantage, where it can act as a state fighting 
against the Islamic State while drawing attention away from its support of the Assad 
regime.  According to the State Department’s most recent report on sponsors of terrorism, 
the Iranian regime continues “to provide arms, financing, training, and the facilitation of 
primarily Iraqi Shia and Afghan fighters to support the Asad regime’s brutal crackdown” 
and Syria as a crucial causeway in its weapons supply route to Hezbollah, while Iran 
conducts operations against ISIS.172  
 
Lebanon 
The third country that presents Iran’s strategic threat to Middle East security that 
is to be examined in this paper is Lebanon.  The United States sees the need for a strong 
bilateral relationship with Lebanon to cooperate on regional security, intelligence sharing, 
and dealing with emerging and common threats from militant groups inspired by al 
Qaeda with operational links to Lebanon, Syria and Iraq.  For Iran, their relationship with 
Lebanon centers around its support for Hezbollah, which includes providing the Lebanese 
militant group with weapons to use South Lebanon as a launch pad for missiles and other 
operations against Israel.  The battle for influence in Lebanon cannot be overlooked by 
the U.S., as Lebanon is a key state in furthering regional security politics.   
The United States has used diplomacy and foreign aid to help keep Lebanon 
stable and out of Iranian control.  Since the end of the brief Israel-Hezbollah war in 2006, 
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Congress has appropriated over $1 billion to support U.S. policies designed to extend 
Lebanese security forces’ control over the country and promote economic growth.173  
With Lebanon’s long history of sectarianism mixed with political violence, and impact of 
regional unrest and the Syrian civil war, it has been challenging for the U.S. to assist 
Lebanon to prevent further uncertainties. 
Since Syria withdrew its forces from Lebanon in 2005, the United States has 
sought to “maintain its traditionally close ties with Lebanon, and to help preserve its 
independence, sovereignty, national unity, and territorial integrity.”174  The United States 
does not want Lebanon to become another arena for proxy competition, but Iran’s 
proactive role in Lebanon since 2005 has made that goal challenging for Washington.   
Because of America’s push to preserve its strategic interests in Lebanon, Iran has 
chosen to divert a great deal of effort toward challenging the U.S. for influence in 
Lebanon and to use Lebanon as a means of disrupting America’s strategic and political 
interests in the broader Levant.  Furthermore, in Lebanon, Iran wants to secure its 
regional hegemonic interests and continue to influence the Arab-Israeli conflict as means 
of shoring up its broader regional position in a mainly Sunni Arab Middle East.175 
U.S. and Iranian strategies to extend their influence over Lebanon, along with the 
assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, have played an impact in 
the emergence of two cross-confessional political groups; the March 14 Alliance and 
March 8 Alliance.  March 14 includes a majority of Lebanon’s Sunni population and is a 
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pro-U.S. and pro-Western coalition.  In contrast, March 8 heavily supports Iran and the 
Assad regime and consists of mostly Shiite-sectarian political forces.  Sectarian divides 
are currently present not only in Beirut’s politics, but also among the Lebanese 
population.  The United States and Iran have sought to use their supported factions in 
Lebanon to strengthen their influence Beirut’s political environment.     
One area where the U.S. has sought to top Iranian influence in Lebanon is by 
aiding the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).  The United States has decided to support its 
allies in Lebanon, particularly the March 14 Alliance, to weaken both Iranian and Syrian 
influence in Lebanon but also to build Lebanon’s national military to confront terrorist 
groups.  Hezbollah is already well-integrated into Lebanese politics and has significant 
military capabilities, which is worrisome for the America, pro-U.S. factions in Lebanon, 
and Israel if the Syrian conflict spills over to Lebanon and creates further instability. 
The United States has put forward considerable investment in helping build up 
Lebanon’s military in order to legitimize Beirut’s security forces as capable of protecting 
the Lebanese population.  Providing support to Lebanon’s military and protecting the 
Lebanese population can strengthen U.S. support in Lebanon.  Despite America’s 
military aid, which has totaled to over $700 million since 2005, there has been limited 
impact on the balance of forces between the LAF and Hezbollah or shaping positive local 
perceptions of American efforts in Lebanon.176  Several challenges have been presented 
by the U.S. in fulfilling its objectives in strengthening the efficacy of the LAF.   
First, sectarianism in Lebanon has made its civil-military dynamics an obstacle to 
develop a coherent national defense strategy to sustain Lebanon’s future security, 
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especially during the Syrian crisis where the LAF has walked a fine line on the conflict, 
seeking to secure the “least bad common denominator” interests of Lebanon’s competing 
communities by limiting the risk of escalating violence.177  Additionally, it is unclear as 
what U.S. military assistance in the future will look like.  The growing threat of ISIS in 
Syria, the need to maintain Israel’s qualitative military edge in an increasingly dangerous 
Levant, and Congress’s skepticism about the effectiveness of aid to the LAF may impact 
America’s future approach toward Lebanon.  
The U.S. has also used the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) as part of its 
strategy to limit Iranian influence in Beirut by indicting members of Hezbollah and its 
allies who are supported by Tehran and attempt to limit justice in Lebanon.  The STL was 
established in 2007 “to hold trials for the people accused of carrying out the attack of 14 
February 2005 which killed 22 people, including the former prime minister of Lebanon, 
Rafiq Hariri.”178  In addition, the United States helped create the STL in the hope of 
finding Syria culpable of Prime Minister Hariri’s death, thereby weakening Syria’s 
regional role and strengthening the position of Lebanese allies of the West in Beirut.  
Lebanese perception of the Tribunal is difficult to assess, as some reports state a majority 
of Lebanese support179 the initiative with others state the opposite.180  Because America is 
viewed unfavorably in Lebanon, and its association with the Tribunal, the STL may be a 
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less effective tool in garnering more U.S. influence in Beirut.181  The prospects of civil 
strife in Syria and security spillover effects in Lebanon, along with Iran and its allies’ 
discrediting of the STL, the focus for U.S. policy-makers will likely be on the impact of 
Syria’s crisis on Lebanon rather than furthering the efficacy of the Tribunal. 
As with Iraq and Syria, Lebanon will likely continue to be an area where Iran’s 
foreign policy attempts to weaken U.S. strategy in the Middle East.  Both countries have 
strategic interests in Beirut, where the U.S. seeks to support pro-U.S. Lebanese factions 
to confront Iranian-backed groups and Iran has used its resources to influence Lebanon in 
promoting its expansionist policies throughout the Levant.   
Unfortunately for the U.S., its military assistance has produced limited results in 
helping the LAF demonstrate their ability to defend Lebanon’s borders.  Consequently, 
there have been instances within the last few years where Iran’s proxy in Hezbollah has 
cooperated with the LAF in border security and other operations.182  This cooperation has 
created a double-edge sword by creating a stronger bond between the LAF and 
Hezbollah, while reinforcing Sunni suspicions that the LAF is becoming dominated by 
Hezbollah and other Shiite elements in Lebanon. 
The future of Lebanon’s stability and U.S. and Iranian policy aimed at projecting 
influence will likely be impacted by the outcome in Syria.  The longer the Syrian civil 
war persists, the more important it will be for the U.S. and its coalition partners to 
minimize future spillover effects from what may be years of instability in the Levant.  
The humanitarian crisis has already flooded Lebanon with over a million refugees.  
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Washington should continue to support the LAF to ensure it is capable of protecting 
Lebanon if ISIS militants seek to expand throughout the Levant.  On the other hand, 
Hezbollah needs the Assad government to remain in power in order to act as a supply line 
for military aid from Iran.  Otherwise, Assad’s fall would place Hezbollah at a significant 
disadvantage in the event of another conflict with Israel.   
Hezbollah, with the support of Iran, is expected to remain Lebanon’s most 
organized political and military force that aims to support its Shiite constituencies and 
characterize itself as a resistance movement against international efforts to shape 
Lebanese affairs.  To maintain its commitment to counter Iranian and Hezbollah 
influence in Lebanon, the United States should continue to bolster and support the LAF 
and take necessary actions to prevent a spillover of the Syrian conflict into Lebanon.     
 
Yemen 
The fourth Middle East area to be analyzed in this paper supporting Iran’s foreign 
policy as threatening to U.S. Middle East strategy and Gulf security is Yemen.  In the 
past year, Iran has become increasingly involved in Yemeni affairs, specifically with 
Iran’s support for the Houthi rebels who are seeking more government power.183  What 
became a cause for concern for the U.S. in Yemen, a country that President Obama touted 
as a model of success for counterterrorism,184 occurred when Houthi rebels seized a 
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significant portion of Yemen’s capital of Sanaa in September 2014.185  Since then, the 
Houthis have disrupted the political transition that was sponsored by the GCC and backed 
by the U.S. three years ago by threatening to intensify Yemen’s internal conflicts.186   
As a result of Houthi advancements, which have been possible with military 
assistance from Iran, the Yemeni government that includes the U.S.-backed Yemeni 
president in Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi and his cabinet have been pushed out of Yemen 
by the Houthis and lack any authoritative power in much of the state.187  Currently 
President Hadi has sought refuge in Saudi Arabia, while the Saudi military and other 
Arab partners conduct a bombing campaign against Houthi rebels.188 
For the United States, Yemen is an important partner in the fight against al Qaeda, 
which is why President Obama has authorized over $800 million to be sent to Sanaa since 
Yemen’s political transition that led to Hadi becoming the nation’s president in 2011.  
Generally, the U.S. has implemented a strategy in Yemen that consists of promoting  
political, economic, and security sector reforms supporting the country’s Gulf 
Cooperation Council-brokered political transition initiative, while helping confront the 
immediate security threat represented by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.189   
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Although President Hadi has no control over his country, the U.S. says it 
continues some of its counterterrorism operations in Yemen,190 but the U.S. has closed its 
embassy there and relocated personnel.191  U.S.-Yemeni relations have been focused 
primarily on combating terrorist threats in Yemen, however, it seems that more U.S. 
efforts to support the Hadi government are needed to also prevent Tehran from 
establishing a pro-Iranian leadership in Yemen.  It is beneficial to the United States to 
support President Hadi, who has been recognized as Yemen’s leader through the Peace 
and National Partnership Agreement signed in Yemen in September 2014.192  Allowing 
the Houthis to gain more control of Yemen is worrisome because while it would be a 
positive step if the Houthis were to agree upon the 2014 Agreement, there are concerns 
that Iran’s continued support for the Houthis could create “a state within a state” that acts 
in contrast to U.S. interests in Yemen.193   
The instability in Yemen has presented the U.S. with a formidable 
counterterrorism challenge.  The current fight for power between the Houthis and Hadi 
supporters should not hinder America’s policy of “helping the government confront the 
immediate security threat represented by [al Qaeda].”194  In addition to using drone 
strikes and other military capabilities to target jihadists, the U.S. will have to work with 
its international partners and political parties in Yemen to ensure the southern Gulf state 
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does not fall into the hands of jihadists who seek to attack the U.S. and allied states in the 
Middle East.  However, divesting too many resources in Yemen to confront Iran’s 
influence is not recommended, as Yemen is “not consequential enough to justify making 
any American investment there.”195  While the U.S. calls upon all parties “to participate 
peacefully in Yemen’s transition process…to build an inclusive system of governance 
that ensures a stable and prosperous future for all Yemenis,” it will be difficult to 
implement such a transition as post-Qaddafi Libya has shown.196  
For Iran, the crisis in Yemen has presented another opportunity for the clerical 
regime to expand its influence in an attempt to strengthen Shia populations in the region.  
Iran’s support for the Houthis has included money, training, and weapons, all of which is 
aimed at weakening U.S. and Saudi goals in Yemen.  To put it more directly, Iran’s 
activity in Yemen has sought to counter American and Saudi influence in determining the 
future of Sanaa.  As one Iranian official had put it, “Everything is about the balance of 
power in the region.  Iran wants a powerful Shi'ite presence in the region that is why it 
has got involved in Yemen as well.”197   
An example of Iran’s attempt to influence Yemeni internal stability, although 
unsuccessful, occurred in 2013.198  According to several sources, an Iranian vessel was 
intercepted off the coast of Yemen containing weapons including Russian-designed SAM 
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2 and SAM 3 anti-aircraft missiles.  The U.S. Navy and the Government of Yemen then 
escorted the vessel to Aden where it was turned over to the Yemeni Coast Guard.  This 
attempt at arming Shiite militias to spur internal power struggles between the Houthis and 
Yemeni government demonstrates the “ever pernicious Iranian meddling in other 
countries in the region,” according to a U.S. official.199 
More recently, the Iranian regime has attempted to support Houthis through arms 
shipments, but was unable to do so as the United States intervened.  Because news 
sources stated in April that Iran may be shipping weapons to the Houthis via a convoy of 
nine cargo ships, the U.S. responded by sending the aircraft carrier USS Theodore 
Roosevelt and the guided-missile cruiser USS Normandy to the Arabian Sea.200  As a 
result, the Iranian convoy was forced to turn around and headed back to Iran.201  The 
increased readiness of U.S. naval presence in the Gulf may become a more effective tool 
in preserving America’s interests and power in the Middle East for the near future. 
What is troubling about Iran’s involvement in Yemen is that it may produce 
another strong, pro-Iranian force near the border of Saudi Arabia, one of America’s top 
Gulf strategic partners.  In January of this year, Ali Shirazi, the Supreme Leader’s 
representative to the Quds force, told the Iranian press that the Houthis are “similar” to 
Hezbollah in Lebanon.202  While having a Hezbollah-type militant group in Yemen 
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would be a strategically important asset to Iran as it can provide a counterforce to its 
archrival in Saudi Arabia, the likelihood of Iran gaining similar net advantages with the 
Houthis as it does with Hezbollah is dubious.   
There have been disagreements between the Houthis and Iran in terms of how to 
move forward with the current situation in Yemen.203  Also, the religious connection Iran 
has with the Houthis has little influence toward any potential Islamic revolution in 
Yemen, as there are religious differences between Houthis and Iranians.204  Therefore, it 
is unlikely that Iran will have the same level of influence over the Houthis as it does with 
Hezbollah in Lebanon or Shiite militias in Iraq.205   
Yemen has become the most recent example of Iran’s pursuit to challenge U.S. 
strategy in the Middle East in order to strengthen its regional influence.  As stated earlier 
in this paper, Iran regularly uses regional crises as an avenue to further its regional goals 
and project greater influence.  With Yemen, religious conflict and sectarian have brought 
the Gulf state to the brink of another civil war, while Iran has been vocal about its support 
for a political solution in Yemen in order to prevent a similar situation in Syria from 
happening in Yemen.206  It is too soon to tell how the crisis in Yemen will unfold, but it 
may be in Iran’s favor to continue its support for the Houthis to maintain its alliance. 
While stability in Iraq and Syria continues to be in jeopardy, it is likely that both 
Iran and the United States will place Yemen as a secondary concern.  Both states hope to 
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maintain their interests and influence within Yemen, but the threat of ISIS has shown to 
be more of a priority.   However, it is probable that the United States and Iran will 
continue to put forth efforts to alter the outcome of Yemen’s crisis, in addition to possibly 
halting the Saudi-led military campaign against the Houthi rebels.   
The U.S. has continued to use its naval forces to block Iran’s weapons shipments 
to Houthi fighters, while also supporting Saudi Arabia and others in the current military 
bombing campaign, which has resonated negatively with the Yemeni populace.  Iran 
remains committed to aiding Houthi rebels, although denies doing so, and regularly calls 
for a peaceful solution to end the bombing and fighting.  However, while Iran’s military 
support is a threat to American allies, the U.S. strategy in Yemen is “not accurately 
diagnosing the problem and therefore not prescribing the right solution or the right kind 
of assistance strategy that would really respond to the needs on the ground,” which 
includes address the pervasive lack of economic opportunity, structural unemployment, 
cronyism, and the inequitable distribution of state resources, according to Atlantic 
Council analyst Danya Greenfield.207  Even if Iraq and Syria continue to draw more 
resources from the U.S. and Iran, Yemen will likely remain an area where the two rivaled 
states attempt to project influence and alter the regional order of the Middle East.    
 
Conclusion 
Iran has shown its willingness and effectiveness to use a variety of strategies to 
further its interests in the Middle East.  Iran’s influence in the region is growing and has 
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become a major concern for many in the U.S. Government, including defense and 
intelligence officials.  For instance, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper 
testified at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing:  
“The way that Iran is exerting its influence…is a combination of 
intelligence and special ops, has extensive commercial enterprise 
businesses…And so they use that as their instrumentality, as they are now 
in Iraq, for extending their influence as one of their proxies. And, of 
course, another one of their proxies is Hezbollah, which they've had a long 
client-subordinate relationship with.”208 
 
As discussed in this chapter, Iran has demonstrated its ability to engage and 
influence the internal affairs of selected nations in the Middle East.  In Iraq, Syria, 
Lebanon, and Yemen, the Iranian regime has instituted soft and hard power capabilities 
to expand its influence, while seeking to minimize any interference by the U.S.  
However, Iran has also been active in other countries in the Middle East as well; such as 
Afghanistan, Bahrain, and Egypt.  While the Iranian regime has taken action to project its 
influence during times of crisis in the region, Tehran has also spoken of strengthening the 
relationships with its regional neighbors. 
When President Rouhani began his time in office, he acknowledged his hope to 
become partners with Arab countries in the region in order to find regional, multilateral 
solutions to today’s crises in the Middle East.  As Foreign Minister Zarif wrote in 
Foreign Affairs last year, President Rouhani’s foreign policy “aims to move Iran away 
from confrontation and toward dialogue, constructive interaction, and understanding, all 
with an eye to safeguarding national security, elevating the stature of Iran, and achieving 
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long-term comprehensive development.”209  Although such a platform would be 
welcomed by the U.S., Israel, and Arab countries, Iran’s interference in Arab states 
across the region, along with its vociferous rhetoric discussing Tehran’s hegemonic 
goals, have made it difficult for anyone to believe transition toward a less hostile Iran can 
occur.  During this year’s Quds Day in Iran which celebrates the condemnation of Israel 
and support for the Palestinian people, the Armed Forces General Staff said: 
“There is no doubt that the strategic depth of the message of the Islamic 
Revolution outlined the formation of Islamic vigilance and resistance [has] 
manifested in the context of the resistance epic and miraculous victories 
[in] recent years of Lebanese Hezbollah and Hamas of Palestine, and in 
the new scenes of Ansar Allah [the al Houthis] in Yemen and the popular 
resistance of Iraq and Syria.”210  
 
Iran’s regional ambitions and the actions it has taken to achieve these aims have 
presented a threat to U.S. allies in the Middle East.  In addition to Iran’s meddling in the 
Middle East and support for multiple terrorist groups, the dangers surrounding Tehran’s 
nuclear program have added to the concerns that Israel and Gulf states have about Iran’s 
regional intentions.  Although the U.S. and its allies do not want to see Iran develop 
nuclear weapons, there are also worries about, as Matthew Kroenig, a fellow at the 
Atlantic Council, says, “If Iran gets major sanctions relief... that will mean more money 
flowing into Iranian coffers and a windfall Iran can use to step up its influence in the 
region even more.”211  Since the beginning of the nuclear talks nearly a decade and a half 
ago, the Gulf states have increased their military spending far more than Iran, likely to 
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preserve its ability to counter Iran’s future destabilizing activities and threats and lessen 
the effectiveness of any future attack on them by Iran.212  To understand how the Iranian 
nuclear program presents a strategic challenge to the U.S. and its regional allies in the 
Middle East, it is necessary to analyze Tehran’s nuclear capabilities.  
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CHAPTER 3: IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND ITS POTENTIAL IMPACT 
ON MIDDLE EAST SECURITY 
 
For years, the Iranian leadership has stated that its nuclear program is being used 
for peaceful purposes with no intent of developing nuclear weapons.  The reference to 
Ayatollah Khamenei’s longstanding nuclear fatwa is commonly made by political leaders 
in Tehran to validate the nature of their nuclear program.  The website for its nuclear 
program, generated by the Iranian government, has a section devoted to the fatwa against 
nuclear weapons as well.213  Although Iran’s Supreme Leader has reiterated the fatwa on 
several occasions, there is question to the validity of the pronouncement and fear that Iran 
may seek nuclear weapons in the future if it deems it necessary to their security.   
There are still concerns about Iran not having answered all the lingering questions 
the IAEA and the P5+1 have about Iran’s past nuclear activities.  The National 
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of 2007 report published by the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence on Iran’s nuclear capabilities did state that Iran ended its nuclear 
weapons program in the fall of 2003, however, the unsettled issues regarding Iran’s 
nuclear program are worrisome for many countries in the Gulf and around the world.214  
To understand why Iran’s neighbors, the U.S., and others are troubled over Iran’s nuclear 
program and how it will impact future U.S. policy in the Middle East, it is important to 
recognize the program’s history and technical capabilities.  
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The Development of Iran’s Nuclear Program 
The Iranian nuclear program began under the Shah in the 1950s when Iran started 
receiving assistance through the U.S. Atoms for Peace program under the Eisenhower 
administration.  In 1967, the U.S. supplied the Tehran Nuclear Research Center with a 
small 5MWt research reactor, fueled by highly enriched uranium (HEU).215  Iran then 
signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state 
(NNWS) in 1968 and ratified the Treaty in 1970.  States who sign the Treaty are bound 
by numerous commitments, one being their fulfillment of a safeguards agreement with 
the IAEA.216  Such an agreement is an essential component to ensuring nonproliferation 
among the NNWS, as it outlines the specific requirements Iran must abide by as a 
signatory of the Treaty to verify its peaceful use of nuclear energy as a NNWS. 
On May 15, 1974, Iran and the Agency agreed to a comprehensive safeguards 
agreement, as standardized through the model agreement laid out in Informational 
Circular (INFCIRC)/153.  As set forth in INFCIRC/153, following the language in 
Article III, paragraph 1 of the NPT, the basic obligation of the state is “to accept 
safeguards…with the [IAEA]…for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment 
of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of 
nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices.”217  This allows IAEA inspectors to verify the presence of all nuclear material 
declared by the inspected state and ensure that there is no undeclared nuclear material.  In 
                                                 
215 “Tehran Research Reactor (TRR).” NTI: Nuclear Threat Initiative. 23 Aug. 2013. http://www.nti.org/facilities/182/. 
216 Article III of Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. 
217 IAEA, The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. INFCIRC/153 (Corrected). IAEA. Article 1. June 1972. 
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1972/infcirc153.pdf.  
74 
order for the IAEA to correctly verify all present nuclear material within a state, the state 
must provide all information about the quantity and quality of all nuclear material.   
Additionally, INFCIRC/153 states that a country shall “establish and maintain a 
system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under 
the Agreement…to enable the Agency to verify…that there has been no diversion of 
nuclear material from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices.”218  An issue for the world powers has been Iran’s lack of transparency with the 
IAEA, specifically its absence of reporting all nuclear material subject to safeguards.  
Article 62 of INFCIRC/153 requests that the state provide the Agency with a full report 
of all nuclear material to ensure the state’s correctness of information.219  Correctness 
refers to providing accurate information on all nuclear material in a nation state.  
Correctness however is not the sole component of proper verification; there needs to be 
completeness, in that a state must not be withholding any nuclear material in its report 
that is under safeguards.   
After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, much of the work on Iran’s nuclear program 
came to a halt.220  The end of the Iran-Iraq War began a renewed focus on Tehran’s 
nuclear technology acquisition in the 1980s and 1990s.  For example, Iran signed long-
term nuclear cooperation agreements with Pakistan and China, in 1987 and 1990 
respectively.  Iran then signed a bilateral agreement with Russia in the 1992, which then 
led to the finished construction of the Bushehr Power Plant.221 
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Not only did Iran engage in open nuclear activities to strengthen its energy 
infrastructure, Tehran also attempted to learn more about developing nuclear weapons.  
The founder of Pakistan’s nuclear program, A.Q. Khan, and his nuclear proliferation 
network had sold Iran a complete set of P-2 centrifuge blueprints in 1996, which Iran 
used when it began constructing and testing P-2 centrifuges in 2002.222  Although large 
parts of its program were openly known by the international community, Iran proved its 
ability to construct covert facilities within its borders.  It was not until mid-2002 when the 
IAEA and the rest of the world realized that Iran had a clandestine enrichment plant, 
which was just one of many unreported activities of Iran’s nuclear program.    
 
Iran’s Non-Compliance with the NPT and IAEA 
In August 2002, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) made an 
announcement that surprised the IAEA and the world.223  The NCRI revealed that Iran 
had a gas centrifuge enrichment plant at Natanz, a heavy water production plant under 
construction at Arak, and Kalaye Electric Company was being used as a front company 
for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran.224  After these discoveries, IAEA inspectors 
visited Iranian facilities and officials, which led to Iran agreeing to sign the Additional 
Protocol and suspend enrichment.  Because Iran’s new declaration contradicted the 
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Agency’s previous information on its nuclear program, the IAEA sought to take all 
necessary measures to confirm Iran’s past and present nuclear activities.   
The revelation of the Natanz facility presented questions as to whether Iran had 
violated its obligations under the NPT.  As written in the safeguards agreement between 
Iran and the Agency, INFCIRC/214, “design information in respect of existing facilities 
shall be provided to the Agency during the discussion of the Subsidiary 
Arrangements...as early as possible before nuclear material is introduced into a new 
facility.”225  The 1976 version of Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements that was part 
of Iran’s safeguards agreement stipulated it must provide facility design information “as 
early as possible, and in any event not later than 180 days before the receipt of any 
nuclear material at the facility concerned.”226  Since Natanz had not received nuclear 
material by August 2002, it is difficult to demonstrate Iran’s breach of this provision.  
However, the failure to provide design information is inconsistent with the general 
obligation to provide this information as early as possible.   
In 2003, Iran agreed to be bound by modified Code 3.1, which required that design 
information should be provided to the IAEA “as soon as the decision to construct or to 
authorize construction has been taken.”227  Were Iran bound by modified Code 3.1 in 
2002, the failure to declare the Natanz facility would have been constituted as a breach.  
Iran then stopped its implementation of modified Code 3.1 in March 2007 and said it 
would revert to the implementation of the 1976 version of Code 3.1.  Nonetheless, the 
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Director General stated in a report in 2007 that “Article 39 of Iran’s Safeguards 
Agreement, agreed Subsidiary Arrangements cannot be modified unilaterally; nor is there 
a mechanism in the Safeguards Agreement for the suspension of provisions agreed to in 
Subsidiary Arrangements.”228   
The main dilemma regarding Iran’s nuclear program involves its allege nuclear 
weapons development-related activities at military sites in the past, or what has been 
commonly referred to in IAEA reports as possible military dimensions (PMDs).  In a 
November 2011 IAEA report, 12 areas of concern were noted by the Agency as issues 
that need to be resolved in order to verify Iran’s peaceful nuclear intentions.229  Iran 
initially rebuffed the Agency’s request to visit Parchin, the facility many believe is where 
nuclear weapons experiments have taken place, but granted access to parts of the 
complex in 2005.  Since 2005, the IAEA remains vigilant in its efforts to visit the 
remainder of the Parchin nuclear site and other areas of concern to prove or disprove any 
possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program. 
Prior to the signing of the JCPOA, Iran agreed to a Framework of Cooperation 
with the Agency which required Iran to implement practical measures to answer issues 
that the IAEA has about Iran’s nuclear program’s history.230  Although Iran has made 
progress in implementing the measures laid out in the first two steps, it still “has not 
provided any explanations that enable the Agency to clarify the two outstanding practical 
                                                 
228 GOV/2007/22 - Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council 
Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran. IAEA. 23 May 2007. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2007-
22.pdf. 
229 GOV/2011/65 - Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council 
Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran. IAEA. 8 Nov. 2011. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2011-
65.pdf. 
230 GOV/2015/15 - Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council 
Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran. IAEA. 19 Feb. 2015. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2015-
15.pdf. 
78 
measures relating to the initiation of high explosives and to neutron transport 
calculations.”231  As part of the JCPOA, Iran has agreed to “fully implement the 
‘Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues’ agreed with the 
IAEA” by October 15, 2015.232 
 
Iran’s Justification of its “Right” to Enrich 
The Iranian regime has repeatedly spoken out about the country’s right to develop 
peaceful nuclear energy under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since it began 
nuclear negotiations over a decade ago.  Iran references Article IV of the Treaty to justify 
its enrichment activities and why the United States and others cannot impede on its 
nuclear program.233  Iran says that Article IV clearly states its inherent right to enrich, 
however, the United States and others believe that the NPT does not explicitly state such 
a right.  As a senior official to the Obama administration said the day of the agreement of 
the 2013 interim nuclear deal, Article IV “is silent on the issue.  It neither confers a right 
nor denies a right.  So we don't believe it is inherently there.”234  The United States 
continues to support this position, but it can be argued that allowing Iran to resume its 
enrichment activities as a result of the JCPOA shows the Obama administration’s 
acceptance of this right to enrich. 
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The Joint Plan of Action 
What was widely seen as a diplomatic breakthrough, the Joint Plan of Action 
(JPOA) laid the foundation for what the international community hopes is a harbinger for 
a long-term nuclear deal between the world powers and Iran.  The agreement aimed “to 
reach a mutually-agreed long-term comprehensive solution that would ensure Iran's 
nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful” and “would enable Iran to fully enjoy its 
right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the relevant articles of the NPT.”235  
The JPOA, agreed upon by the P5+1 on November 24, 2013 in Geneva, was originally a 
six-month accord that was to lead to a lasting comprehensive deal, but was extended until 
November 24, 2014 as both sides were unable to resolve all outstanding issues.   
Within the agreement, there is a list of concessions from both the world powers 
and the Islamic Republic.  Of the list of mandates towards Iran, the most notable are 
Iran’s pledge to dilute half of its 20% enriched UF6 stocks to uranium oxide with 
enrichment below 5% and convert the other half to 20% enriched uranium oxides; to not 
enrich uranium over 5%; and to not make any further advances of its activities at the 
Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant, Fordow, or the Arak reactor.236  In return, the P5+1, or 
EU/E+3 as it is stated in the agreement, agreed to suspend sanctions on a several sectors 
of Iran’s economy, to not pass any new nuclear-related UNSC resolutions, to enable 
repatriation of frozen funds overseas to Iran.   
From January 20th to July 20th 2014, Iran was seen to have complied with many of 
the steps it agreed upon back in November.  Iran’s compliance with the agreed upon steps 
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in the Joint Plan of Action relied upon verification measures taken up by the IAEA.  In 
the JPOA, Iran agreed to take several measures that would increase its “breakout time,” 
or the time it would take for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon.  At the beginning of the 
six-month term, the IAEA issued a report stating Iran’s accordance with the Joint Plan of 
Action.  Several of the most notable points made in the document included the Agency’s 
confirmation that Iran had ceased enriching uranium over 5% U-235, began diluting UF6 
enriched up to 20% U-235 into U3O8, continued to construct a power plant to convert UF6 
up to 5% U-235 to oxide, continued safeguarded research and development practices 
which were not designed to accumulate enrichment production.237   
In addition to these actions by the Islamic Republic, the IAEA’s report also 
highlighted the fact that Iran sent written communications to the Agency in relation to its 
“voluntary measures” under the JPOA.  These letters from Iran detailed how there would 
be no new location for enrichment other than those already existing at the Fordow and 
Natanz sites, that will not engage in stages of reprocessing activities, or construction of a 
facility capable of reprocessing, and that there is no reconversion line to reconvert 
uranium oxide enriched up to 20% U-235 back into UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235.
238   
It is also important to note that besides Iran’s interim agreement with the world 
powers, Iran agreed upon measures to strengthen cooperation with the IAEA.  This 
agreement, known as the Joint Statement on a Framework for Cooperation, was signed 
by the Director General of the IAEA and Vice President of Iran on November 13, 2013.  
Both parties agreed on the statement in pursuit of strengthening “their cooperation and 
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dialogue aimed at ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme” 
in order to address all outstanding issues that the IAEA has not been able to resolve.239   
Such an agreement with the Agency presumed that Iran will cooperate to resolve 
all past and present issues surrounding its nuclear program and do so in a timely manner.  
Also, the Agency agreed to take into account Iran’s national security in regards to 
information Iran sees as confidential.  However, the IAEA and its safeguards practices 
explicitly state what activities or facilities are included in these practices, but it does not 
guarantee Iran will comply.  This framework is a key component to the verification of 
Iran’s nuclear program, as it is the IAEA who provides greater assurance to the world if 
Iran has or will divert its program towards nuclear weapons.   
 
Framework for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
What was deemed as a “historic understanding with Iran” on April 2, 2015, the 
P5+1 and Iran agreed on a foundation for which the final text of the Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action (JCPOA) was written.240  The decided framework addressed many issues 
of concern regarding Iran’s nuclear program, from its future enrichment capacity to 
inspections at Iran’s nuclear facilities.  In addition, the lifting of sanctions was addressed 
where Iran would receive sanctions relief, if it verifiably abides by its commitments 
stated in a final deal.  From the fact sheet provided by the State Department shortly after 
the framework was announced, several noticeable provisions included: 
- Iran has agreed to go from having about 19,000 installed centrifuges 
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today to 6,104 installed under the deal, with only 5,060 of these 
enriching uranium for 10 years.  All 6,104 centrifuges will be IR-1s, 
Iran’s first-generation centrifuge;  
- Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium over 3.67% for at least 15 years; 
- The IAEA will have regular access to all of Iran’s nuclear facilities, 
including to Iran’s enrichment facility at Natanz and its former 
enrichment facility at Fordow, and including the use of the most up-to-
date, modern monitoring technologies; 
- Iran has agreed to implement the Additional Protocol and modified 
Code 3.1 and; 
- Iran will ship all of its spent fuel from the reactor out of the country 
for the reactor’s lifetime.241 
While the State Department’s fact sheet provides hope for a comprehensive deal, 
it should be noted that the U.S. and Iran provided different accounts as to what the 
framework entailed.  Several days after the framework was established, the Iranian 
government produced a statement detailing how it interpreted the parameters of a final 
agreement.  For instance, Iran’s statement believed all sanctions would be immediately 
removed after the implementation of a deal, that Iran will “voluntarily” abide by the 
Additional Protocol, and research and development with its advanced centrifuges would 
continue.242  Despite the different accounts of what the framework entailed, the world 
powers and Iran were able to achieve a comprehensive nuclear agreement in July 2015.   
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Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
On July 14th, 2015, the P5+1 and Iran agreed upon a landmark nuclear deal called 
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action aimed to end Iran’s potential path toward the 
development of nuclear weapons.  According to President Obama, “America negotiated 
from a position of strength and principle” and because of this deal, “the international 
community will be able to verify that the Islamic Republic of Iran will not develop a 
nuclear weapon.”243  The 159-page document with five Annexes includes the basic 
provision of the deal, sanctions relief, and steps toward allowing the IAEA to verify the 
peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program.244     
On the day the agreement was reached, the White House published on its website 
the parameters of the deal.  Several of the key provisions of the agreement include: 
- the JCPOA will produce the comprehensive lifting of all UNSC 
sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to 
Iran’s nuclear program;  
- a Joint Commission consisting of the P5+1 and Iran will be 
established to monitor the implementation of this JCPOA;  
- Iran will keep its level of uranium enrichment at up to 3.67% at a 
total of 300kg for 15 years;  
- Iran is required to redesign its Arak heavy water research reactor to 
prevent weapons-grade plutonium production; 
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- Iran will cooperate with the IAEA to address all past and present 
issues of concern relating to its nuclear program; 
- The UN Security Council resolution endorsing the JCPOA will 
terminate all the provisions of the previous UN Security Council 
resolutions on the Iranian nuclear issue simultaneously with the 
IAEA-verified implementation of agreed nuclear-related measures by 
Iran and will establish specific restrictions, and; 
- U.S. and EU economic and financial sanctions will be terminated 
simultaneously with IAEA-verified implementation of agreed 
nuclear-related measures by Iran.245 
Although an agreement has been made by all parties of the nuclear talks, the 
deal will not be in effect until all participants endorse the deal.  The most notable states 
whose domestic political systems may interfere with the endorsement of the JCPOA are 
the United States and Iran.  For the U.S., Congress has 60 days to review and accept the 
agreement as law, according to Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 that was 
passed in April.246  In Iran, its parliament, known as the Majlis, has the task of 
reviewing the deal, but does not vote on it.  The Supreme Leader ultimately has the 
final decision in whether or not to endorse the agreement.  Despite opposition of the 
deal from Iranian hardliners, it is likely that the Supreme Leader will likely base his 
judgment on what the U.S. Congress decides in order to provide him with more options.  
For instance, congressional rejection “might be a better scenario for the Supreme Leader 
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because it would give him an excuse to prolong the process without Iran taking the 
blame.”247  
Whether or not politicians from the U.S. and Iran oppose the nuclear deal, its 
endorsement will likely have a significant impact on the regional security environment 
of the Middle East.  Just as before a deal was finalized, U.S. allies in the Middle East 
continue to be cautious about the impact the deal with have on regional security.  In the 
section that follows, it will be discussed how the JCPOA could potentially affect the 
Middle East, specifically regarding the security of Israel and the states of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE, Qatar, and Oman).    
 
Potential Security Implications for the Middle East 
The JCPOA could have profound implications for the Middle East, particularly 
for Israel and the GCC states.  On the one hand, the Iran nuclear agreement, if 
successfully implemented, removes the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran and has the 
potential to lower regional tensions.  On the other hand, the sanctions relief of the JCPOA 
will presumably increase the economic resources available to Iran to promote its interests 
in the region, such as improving its defense capabilities and financing pro-Iranian 
terrorist groups both of which are inimical to the interests of the United States and its 
allies.  In either case, it seems that what is more important is how U.S. allies will respond 
to the deal rather than the elements of the deal itself. 
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At the moment, it can be said that Iran feels comfortable about the status quo.  As 
stated earlier in this paper, Iran’s Shia allies are dominant in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and 
Yemen.  Because Iran has poured significant amount of resources to its allies in these 
states, it is likely that Tehran will devote a small, but significant, amount of the total 
funds it will receive from formerly blocked bank accounts as a result of the JCPOA to 
enhance its conventional military capabilities.   
While there are critics of the Iran deal who believe Iran will increase its spending 
on supporting its terrorist and proxy groups by billions of dollars in the near-term, this 
may not be probable due to Iran’s domestic economic issues.248  Recent numbers show 
that while Iran’s inflation rate has dropped in half in the past two years because of the 
sanctions relief under the JPOA, Iran continues to struggle with its unemployment rate of 
over 13% and its aging population.249  Because of Iran’s economic issues, it is plausible 
that Iran will use the windfall to address its domestic needs, especially if oil prices remain 
low.  In addition to Iran’s potential focus on addressing its internal economic problems, 
Iran is unlikely to expend billions of dollars instantly on funding its expansionist policies 
in the Middle East because such activities are already effective with their current budget. 
As previously stated in this paper, Iran has been able to display its efficacy in projecting 
influence across the Middle East, even under the conditions of stringent global sanctions.  
Iran’s meddling in the region through propping up its terrorist and proxy forces and 
supporting the Assad regime in Syria, has been somewhat inexpensive in comparison to 
Iran’s overall gross domestic product (GDP).  In 2014, Iran’s GDP totaled at just over 
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$400 billion, which accounted for 3% growth from 2013.250  While Iran’s economy 
staggered and now is beginning to recover, the Islamic Republic has been able to fund its 
inexpensive war in the meantime.  According to some experts:  
“Iranian support for sectarian militias in Iraq and Syria, even the highest 
estimates -- $300 monthly salaries for 140,000 militia members plus 
another $900 per month each for arms and sustenance -- amount to only 
$2 billion annually.  Propping up Syria's Assad regime may require a few 
billion dollars a year, but much of Iran's funding to date has been in the 
form of oil it could not otherwise easily sell (because of sanctions and 
poor market conditions), not cash.  Tehran's numerous other operations in 
Iraq and Syria -- from bribery to humanitarian aid -- may cost another $1-
2 billion.”251        
 
Whether or not Iran chooses not to spend significant amounts of its unfrozen 
financial toward funding its proxy allies in the region, it is likely Iran will devote a small 
(in relative terms) amount of its now accessible hard currency to improving its 
conventional military capabilities. 
In addition to endorsing the Iran nuclear deal, the United Nations Security 
Council also passed UNSC Resolution 2231.  UNSCR 2231 bans arms transfers by Iran 
without the permission of the UN Security Council until the ban is lifted in five years.252  
Because Iran has rejected the interpretation and legal standing of the resolution, it is 
probable that Iran will try and acquire major weapons systems from foreign sellers.253  
One example where Iran may test the provisions of the UNSCR and impose its 
interpretation of the resolution on the international community is the Russian S-300 
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surface-to-air missile system that Iran originally signed a contract to purchase in 2007 but 
Russia then pulled out in 2010 due to international pressure.254   
Other potential implications of the nuclear deal are that Iran may look to continue 
to improve its missile program and conventional military weaponry in order to strengthen 
its defenses at home and to support its proxies and troops throughout the region.  As 
stated in UNSCR 2231, the ban on arms transfers to Iran expires five years after 
“Adoption Day,” or the day when the nuclear deal is officially adopted by all parties.  If 
the conflicts in Iraq and Syria are still occurring after five years, Iran is likely to seek 
advanced munitions, armored vehicles, attack helicopters, and ground support aircraft for 
its allies, proxies, and its own forces fighting in Syria and Iraq.   
Additionally, UNSCR 2231 calls upon Iran to avoid the testing and development 
of ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons for eight years 
after “Adoption Day,” although there is no prescribed penalty for it continuing with such 
activities.255  While the resolution does mention the development and testing of ballistic 
missiles, it is silent on cruise missiles.  It is difficult to assess how UNSCR 2231 will 
impact Iran’s missile program.  However, the ambiguous context of the resolution, along 
with the influx of funds due to the unfreezing of Iranian overseas accounts, Iran may use 
its new cash “to pay off the middle-men and fund the various legal and illicit entities that 
make such proscribed transfers possible” while making “continued incremental progress 
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with its liquid- and solid-fuel MRBM and ICBM programs for the duration of UNSCR 
2231.”256 
In addition to Iran’s potential activity as a result of the JCPOA, it is important to 
analyze the potential responses of U.S. regional allies.  One country’s reaction that was 
highly predictable was Israel’s.  As expected based upon Israel’s past of opposing Iran 
retaining any level of nuclear infrastructure, Prime Minister Netanyahu quickly opposed 
the nuclear deal the same day it was announced by stating that the “world is a much more 
dangerous place.”257 
If Iran chooses to continue its current policies in the Middle East even after the 
nuclear deal is enforced, the more important potential implication is the Iranian belief that 
America’s behavior after the agreement will be interpreted as a sign of further 
disengagement of the Middle East.  Thus, as Kenneth Pollack of The Brookings 
Institution stated during a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, “the most 
important variable in Iranian regional behavior after a deal may well prove to be the U.S. 
reaction, rather than anything derived from Iranian strategy or politics itself.”258  
 
Conclusion 
When Barack Obama became president in 2009, he sought to amend the relations 
between the U.S. and Iran, in order to address the concerns surrounding Iran’s nuclear 
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program.  At the onset, President Obama publicly spoke of his goal to engage with the 
political leaders of Iran.  To put words into action, the U.S. brokered a deal in 2009 that 
would have “required [Iran] to send about three-quarters of its current known stockpile of 
low-enriched uranium to Russia to be processed and returned for use in a reactor in 
Tehran used to make medical isotopes.”259  Tehran originally accepted the deal, but then 
rejected the proposal as some politicians in Iran disapproved of sending Iranian uranium 
out of the country.   
The Obama administration then began a dual-track policy by keeping engagement 
as a possibility, while pushing for new sanctions.  In the end, the U.S. worked with allies 
to create a new sanctions package to apply additional pressure on Iran, specifically UNSC 
Resolution 1929.260  However, the presidential election of Hassan Rouhani changed the 
focus, shape, and approach to U.S. and Iranian diplomatic negotiations.   
In June 2013, Hassan Rouhani became the next president of the Islamic Republic 
who looked to reintegrate Iran into the international community.  President Rouhani 
wanted to revive the Iranian economy and to do so required the lifting of sanctions placed 
on the Islamic Republic from the U.S. and UN Security Council.  Since the phone call 
between Presidents Obama and Rouhani in September 2013 after the UN General 
Assembly, diplomatic relations between the two nations have been at its highest point 
since the 1979 Revolution.261   
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Because the U.S., and the rest of the world powers, have changed their stance on 
Iran’s uranium enrichment capacity over the past six years, from not allowing Iran to 
enrich to accepting limited enrichment, the U.S. needs to develop a strategy that copes 
with this transformation.  With Iran pursuing destabilizing regional ambitions in the 
Middle East that represent a strategic threat to American interests and allies, it is 
recommended that the U.S. reevaluate its Middle East policy to assure that Iran does not 
use sanctions relief and remaining nuclear energy capacity to expand its revolutionary 
agenda throughout the region.  Thus, the U.S. should update its Middle East policy that 
adapts to Iran playing a larger regional role without conceding any U.S. interests or 
weakening alliances.  The following chapter will discuss recommendations to do so.  
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RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
The recent nuclear deal between the world powers and Iran will likely have an 
impact on America’s future strategy in the Middle East.  As stated earlier, several of 
America’s allies continue to be concerned over Iran’s intentions in the region, some of 
which are more worried that the nuclear deal will allow Iran to spend more resources 
towards its regional ambitions.  Whether or not Iran willfully abides by its commitments 
written in the JCPOA, the United States should be prepared to adjust its policy in the 
Middle East that factors in potential increased spending by Iran toward modernizing its 
military capabilities and supporting Shia factions.   
To preserve a dominant American role, the United States should not trade 
temporary nuclear cooperation for acquiescence to Iranian hegemony in the Middle East.  
As discussed earlier in the paper, Iran has used its political, economic, and military 
capabilities to project influence in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen.  Because each of 
these four conflicts includes different levels of Iranian influence, the United States will 
have to develop separate strategies toward each conflict-driven state to further weaken 
Iranian influence in the region and again project America’s support toward its regional 
allies.  However, the U.S. should have each strategy aim towards reaching its regional 
goals of maintaining a regional balance of power, securing the free flow of oil in the 
region; and defeating Islamist terror groups in the region.  Thus, the United States should 
implement a holistic doctrine using all elements of national power, particularly based on 
offshore balancing while also pursuing military assistance and training programs to 
demonstrate its commitment to the security of Israel and Gulf allies and prevent Iran from 
weakening America’s position in the region.    
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Preserving the Security of GCC Allies Through an Artful Balance 
The basic principle of any future U.S. force posture in the Gulf should include the 
continuation of U.S. military access to the Gulf.  This is the bedrock of the U.S.-GCC 
military alliance and the principal reason the Gulf states still look to the United States as 
their main strategic partner.   From the reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers and U.S. naval 
operations against Iran’s naval forces in the late 1980s to the massive military investment 
in driving out Iraq’s forces from Kuwait and deterring their return throughout the 1990s, 
the U.S. military has demonstrated itself as a military ally to its Gulf partners.262  The 
Gulf is a region of strategic importance to the United States and its security environment 
has evolved since the 1980s and 1990s, which is why revamping America’s approach to 
the region is necessary to include the future growing role of Iran in the Middle East.   
As outlined in a report by the Atlantic Council earlier this year, the pillars of U.S. 
defense strategy in the Gulf as it relates to Iran are deterrence, preventing Iran from 
acquiring nuclear weapons, containing its regional reach, and deterring it from attacking 
or coercing its neighbors; reassurance, comforting Gulf allies that a nuclear deal with 
Iran would not give Tehran license to expand its destabilizing influence in the region, 
while retaining America’s robust military capabilities in the Gulf; counterterrorism, 
weakening and destroying Islamist extremists who threaten the U.S. and its allies; and 
political development, which ranges from modest political opening to fundamental 
nation-building.263   
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Because Iran poses a multidimensional challenge, directly through its contentious 
nuclear program and evolving missile arsenal and other weapons systems, and indirectly 
through local, non-state proxies, the United States should seek to find the right balance to 
address these challenges.  This approach should include the means to deter Iran from 
attacking and coercing its neighbors, which may be done through Iran potentially 
acquiring nuclear weapons and Iran increasing the use of its asymmetric threats.   
For instance, it is recommended that the United States implement an offshore 
balance approach in the Gulf region that focuses on the use of air and naval capabilities to 
counter threats, while also enhancing its commitment to its GCC allies by bolstering their 
defense capabilities through arms sales and military training.  These elements can help 
the United States develop a balanced strategy to limit the threat posed by Iran, but also 
show America’s capability to provide security to the Middle East. 
Offshore Balancing.  The idea of offshore balancing in the Middle East should 
not be interpreted as America’s strategy of abandoning its commitments in a strategic 
region vital to U.S. interests.  The Middle East comprises of a multitude of security 
concerns for the United States; from Iran’s nuclear and asymmetric capabilities to the 
threat posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.  These challenges of the 21st century 
will require a new and adaptive strategy, which offshore balancing can provide.  As 
Stephen Walt from Harvard University describes, offshore balancing: 
“…is the ideal grand strategy for an era of U.S primacy.  It husbands the 
power on which U.S. primacy depends and minimizes the fear that U.S. 
power provokes.  By setting clear priorities and emphasizing reliance on 
regional allies, it reduces the danger of being drawn into unnecessary 
conflicts and encourages other states to do more to help us.  Equally 
important, it takes advantage of America’s favorable geopolitical position 
and exploits the tendency for regional powers to worry more about each 
other than about the United States.  But it is not a passive strategy, and 
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does not preclude using the full range of U.S. power to advance core 
American interests.”264 
 
Thus, offshore balancing in the Middle East would allow the United States to 
continue to maintain a balance among the regional powers and intervene when American 
interests are at risk.  Again, these interests include confronting external aggression 
against allies and partners in the region, ensuring the free flow of energy from the region 
to the world, dismantling terrorist networks that threaten our people, preventing the 
development or use of weapons of mass destruction, and helping create a peaceful, 
prosperous, stable and democratic Middle East.265   
Implementing an offshore balance of power strategy would require the U.S. to 
adjust its current posture in the Middle East.  As a global power, the United States should 
be involved in the Middle East as it has many strategic interests in the region.  However, 
many of the region’s conflicts reside from cultural and religious differences that date 
back thousands of years.  Thus, the United States should assert itself where it believes it 
can enhance regional security and not get bogged down fighting the wars of its regional 
partners.  Accordingly, offshore balancing would have regional powers “bear the primary 
responsibility for dealing with crises on the ground,” where U.S. military strategy would 
be “oriented toward policing the sea lanes and the skies,” and “direct intervention is 
contemplated only when the balance of power is dramatically upset.”266   
The use of offshore balancing in the Middle East will vary between security 
issues.  Since America is in no position to end the Sunni-Shia conflict in the Middle East, 
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offshore balancing is an appropriate strategy that will allow the United States to display 
its ability to address other national security concerns in the region.  Examples where 
acting as an offshore balancer can be effective are towards weakening the Islamic State 
threat and Iran’s influence in Iraq and Syria.  In the case of the Islamic State in Iraq and 
Syria, the United States should find ways to limit ISIS’s ability to flex and recover to 
resume offensive attacks and to provide ways to maximize tactical opportunities to 
degrade ISIS.  Doing so can provide important opportunities to build momentum for anti-
ISIS forces through successive and cumulative tactical victories.   
For instance, the U.S. should continue to provide military support from a distance 
through airstrikes on ISIS targets, but also do more in bolstering Iraqi armed forces and 
pro-Western groups in Syria.   Airstrikes should be designed to prevent local ISIS 
victories, act against time-sensitive or high-value targets, and prevent mass killings.  
Thus, effective airstrikes can “prevent ISIS victories, break its momentum, degrade its 
capabilities, and contain the group militarily” and “isolate ISIS’s forces in Iraq and Syria 
and prevent them from reinforcing one another, and buy time and space to organize and 
grow America’s partners on the ground in Iraq.”267  Conducting an impactful air 
campaign can assist other efforts of defeating ISIS, such as training anti-ISIS, pro-
Western forces in Iraq and Syria who need to take the lead in regaining control of their 
territory. 
To weaken the Islamic State, the U.S. needs to strengthen its train and assist 
mission by placing forward-deployed teams of advisors into the region to help the Iraqi 
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security forces and pro-Western rebels fight more effectively.  Generating or rebuilding 
forces in the rear is not enough, which is why forward-deployed train and assist teams – 
such as Special Forces or Rangers – are necessary to spot good combat leaders and warn 
against weak, ineffective, or corrupt ones.  These teams are needed to provide 
intelligence back to the military commanders and strategists that static or inexperienced 
pro-Western leaders and units cannot; to be a voice for active patrolling; and to be a 
second voice when resupply, reinforcement, regrouping.  Plus these train and assist teams 
can encourage effective civil-military action, such as in Iraq where Iraqi units have a 
different ethnic or sectarian bias or simply think in tactical terms rather than how to 
create a local capability to hold, recover, and build at both the military and civil levels.268  
In Iraq, some options have been around for several months but have lacked the 
resources to be fully implemented.  For instance, as stated at a State Department briefing 
in May 2015, some elements of a coherent strategy include a program focused on 
mobilizing tribal fighters in Anbar, with a streamlined delivery mechanism for weapons, 
and developing a national guard law that would provide Iraq with provincial-based 
security forces that are decentralized from Baghdad providing governors with more 
responsibility to protect their provinces.269  Assisting the Iraqi government and 
supporting these programs will help build unity in Iraq, strengthen Iraq’s security forces, 
and limit Iran’s influence in Iraq and its central government. 
In addition to enhancing its train and assist program, the U.S. should raise the 
level of its air support.  Presently, America’s air campaign with its allies from across the 
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globe has not stopped ISIS from continuing to gain ground in both Iraq and Syria.  
Several criticisms of the U.S. coalition’s air campaign have been their exertion of 
prudence when it comes to bombing ISIS targets where civilians may be killed and the 
targets being hit are not effectively pushing back ISIS.  According to an Iraqi army 
commander, “We…asked the U.S. coalition to attack ISIS convoys while they were 
moving from one place to another, but they either neglected our requests or responded 
very late.”270  The U.S. cannot always let civilian casualties avoid them from launching 
strikes on ISIS targets, as ISIS will likely continue to use civilians as human shield to 
protect themselves and their assets.  Plus, placing advisors on the ground with allies in 
Iraq and Syria can better allow the U.S. to gain intelligence and identify and strike 
strategic targets against ISIS more quickly and effectively and potentially limit civilian 
casualties. 
As with Iraq and Syria, a more impactful strategy in Lebanon after the Iran 
nuclear deal will require bolstering internal state actors friendly to the U.S. inside 
Lebanon.  The U.S. can cooperate with Saudi Arabia to help strengthen Lebanese security 
forces and their ability to better defend Lebanon’s borders against outside threats than 
Iran’s proxy in Hezbollah.  Developing a more enduring Lebanese security apparatus is 
essential to the country’s long-term future, as “Hezbollah’s ongoing participation in Syria 
is increasingly making Lebanon a target of Sunni militants, as is the apparent 
cooperation/deconfliction between Hezbollah and Beirut in the domestic fight against 
ISIS.”271  There are several options the U.S. can pursue to weaken Iran’s influence 
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through Hezbollah in Lebanon, while strengthening Lebanon’s internal strength by 
creating a stronger Lebanese state apparatus. 
For example, America’s assistance in Lebanon must be first tailored to helping 
improve the security situation in Lebanon.  Specifically, the U.S. “should help the 
Lebanese Army in the areas of leadership, soldier training, communications, 
organizational skills, and research and development.”272  The U.S. has already shown its 
willingness to provide Lebanese security forces with military hardware including Huey II 
helicopters273 and Hellfire II missiles,274 but better training and military-to-military 
cooperation can produce more long-term impacts than annual military sales in building 
sustainable security forces that are more competent than Hezbollah.  Training should also 
include the development of Lebanese Training Teams, where U.S. Special Operation 
Forces train Lebanese Armed Forces officers to become instructors.  Those LAF officers 
then teach other Lebanese soldiers while developing leadership experience of their 
own.275 
In addition to the U.S. cooperating with Lebanon to build a sustainable and 
effective military apparatus, Saudi Arabia can play a helpful role in working with 
Lebanon’s security forces.  Saudi Arabia is keen to see Lebanon’s army defend its 
borders against armed groups, particularly ISIS and the al Qaeda-linked Nusra Front, 
instead of having Hezbollah fighters do so.  Riyadh has also shown its commitment to 
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enhancing Beirut’s security capabilities through multiple military grants that have 
allowed Lebanon to purchase military equipment from other countries like France and 
China.276 
Plus, the U.S. needs to have a focus on gaining more allies with Lebanon’s Shiite 
community.  America’s announcement earlier this year to cancel State Department 
Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) funding for “independent” non-Hezbollah 
Shiites should be reversed.277  MEPI is needed in Lebanon to offer the Shiite community 
assistance, training, and support to groups and individuals striving to create positive 
change in the society.  Such support can counter Iran and Hezbollah’s influence within 
Lebanon.  In all, the U.S. must address the challenge of Hezbollah in Lebanon by 
working with regional allies like Saudi Arabia to further bolster Lebanon’s security 
forces while funding programs that develop Shiite political voices to Hezbollah. 
Finally, the United States seeks a stable, unified Yemen that is no longer home to 
transnational terrorist groups targeting Western or Saudi interests.  However, whether or 
not the U.S. and the broader international community have the will or means to achieve 
this goal is an open question.  Saudi Arabia endures much more of a direct impact from 
Yemen’s current crisis than the U.S., including “Iran’s growing clout in the region; the 
development of a Shia movement in Yemen; the import of a Shia–Sunni civil war into 
Saudi Arabia; and wider border instabilities.”278  The U.S. can at least act as an offshore 
balancer to support Saudi Arabia and prevent Iran from developing a large pro-Iranian 
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Shiite presence in Yemen that threatens the security of Saudi Arabia.  The U.S. has already 
been helping its GCC allies in the Saudi-led air campaign against the Houthi rebels in 
Yemen, but such a strategy in the long-term may become an open-ended campaign that 
does not create the stability that Yemen needs.279   
However, every form of security is likely to include some military aspect.  Thus, 
the U.S. should continue to support Hadi loyalists through continued intelligence support 
to drive out Houthi rebels from strategic cities within Yemen.  Also, redeploying Special 
Forces to train troops and tribal groups loyal to Hadi, whether in Yemen or at regional 
bases can help lead to the return of Hadi to Aden.  Once the situation permits it, the U.S. 
can redirect all aid, budgetary support, and diplomatic efforts to Hadi’s government in 
Aden; encourage regional partners to do the same; and convene an academic symposium 
of leading experts on Yemen to inform more effectively to policymakers a detailed 
understanding of the country's politics required to build lasting stability.280  The U.S. will 
need to engage with its regional partners to develop a more coherent strategy to help end 
the crisis in Yemen and stop Iran from expanding its influence near Saudi borders.  
Another part of that balance strategy that could be implemented toward the crisis 
in Yemen is the use of its naval ships in the strategic waterways of the Middle East.  The 
U.S. has already demonstrated its ability to act as an offshore balancer in Yemen by 
increasing the Navy’s presence in the Gulf.  In April, the U.S. sent seven warships, 
including an aircraft carrier and a guided-missile cruiser, to show Iran its willingness to 
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increase the stakes if antagonized and to “ensure the vital shipping lanes in the region 
remain open and safe.”  Additionally, the U.S. can use these air and sea capabilities to 
continue its counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, who 
has looked to take advantage of the current crisis in Yemen.281 
Because the airstrikes conducted mostly by Saudi Arabia have not produced any 
significant result in helping end the violence in Yemen, the U.S. will likely have to resort 
to other strategies to achieve its goals in Yemen.  First, the United States should work 
with its Gulf allies, the UN, and Iran to enact a ceasefire by all parties to provide some 
level of stability in the conflict-driven state.  To act as a mediator, the U.S. will likely 
have to ease its support to the Saudi offensive to prevent America’s capacity to mediate 
from eroding.  Follow-on mechanisms that can help rebuild political and economic 
entities in Yemen include supporting socially accountable civil society organizations that 
are inclusive and considerate of Yemen’s ethnic and tribal divides and helping facilitate 
political reform by working through a regional organization, similar to the GCC, to help 
rebuild a federalist system that is more inclusive and considerate of tribal and ethnic 
lines.282  Yemen’s current crisis will require an international and long-term approach, 
however, implementing the steps listed above can provide the U.S. with some level of 
success in weakening Iran’s growing influence in Yemen and help rebuild the security 
situation in Yemen.  In addition to implementing an offshore balance strategy, the U.S. 
should continue to cooperate with its Gulf allies in strengthening their defense 
capabilities such as missile defenses. 
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Missile Defense Cooperation.  To deal with Iran’s expanding conventional 
military capabilities, America’s Gulf allies have looked to the U.S. for certain assurances 
and support.  At the recent Camp David Summit in May 2015 where President Obama 
met with the leaders and high-level delegates from the GCC countries, President Obama 
sought to reaffirm and deepen their close partnership.  According to a joint statement 
between the U.S. and the GCC states, the leaders “discussed how best to address regional 
conflicts and defuse growing tensions,” and “pledged to further deepen U.S.-GCC 
relations…in order to build an even stronger, enduring, and comprehensive strategic 
partnership aimed at enhancing regional stability and prosperity.”283  As a result of the 
Summit, the U.S. and GCC states committed to enhancing ballistic missile defenses in the 
region to counter Iran’s threatening air and missile defenses.  Enhanced missile defenses 
are an important element of displaying continued U.S. engagement with its GCC allies, 
since Iran’s short and intermediate-range missiles put major population centers and 
critical infrastructure on the Arabian Peninsula in range of Iranian strikes. 
According to an annex to the U.S.-GCC Camp David Joint Statement, the U.S. 
has also promised to “help conduct a study of GCC ballistic missile defense architecture 
and offered technical assistance in the development of a GCC-wide Ballistic Missile 
Early Warning System.”284  Assisting in developing a Gulf-wide missile defense systems 
would be beneficial to all GCC states in addressing the enduring threat of Iran’s missile 
capabilities.  While Iran’s missile capabilities may not pose as serious of a threat 
compared to those from Iranian proxy forces or its nuclear program, Iran can use its 
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“conventionally armed missiles long-range rockets as terror weapons, and strike against 
large area targets like petroleum export facilities and cities” that are within the borders of 
American regional allies.285  Also, increasingly effective missile defenses can reassure 
GCC allies against the missile threats posed by Iran’s proxy groups, whose missile 
capabilities may become more of a problem in the future like they are today with Israel. 
In addition to providing U.S. training and hardware for these capabilities, the United 
States needs to enhance cooperation among its Gulf partners. 
Despite the common threat of Iran, there is a feeling of distrust between some of 
the GCC states because of past complications and historical events.  To promote Gulf 
cooperation on regional missile defense architecture, the United States can play a 
supportive role.  For instance, the U.S. can provide guidance in areas of information 
sharing, including early warning tracking data, among the GCC countries by 
recommending a sharing-based network.  Such a network would lessen the distrust 
between certain states and over time can become a strong tool to prevent Iranian missiles, 
or those of its proxies, from targeting Gulf states. 
In regards to a Gulf missile defense capability, the United States can look for 
ways to improve decision-making processes for weapon releasability for additional 
systems such as the Standard Missile and Aegis.286  This can be done through the 
authorization of defense articles or defense services aimed at improving the Gulf’s 
ballistic missile capabilities.  Finally, the U.S. can help its regional partners in developing 
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a doctrine and concepts of operation that will allow coordination in knowing who shoots 
down an incoming missile, when, and with how many interceptors.  With warning times 
as short as four minutes, a quick reactionary response requires significant pre-delegation, 
which can be built through training, tabletop exercises, senior leader seminars, live-fire 
tests, and demonstrations of interconnectivity.  The United States has significant training 
in the field of missile defense, and it should use this know-how to improve the defense 
capabilities of its Gulf allies in order to deter and defend against future missile attacks 
from Iran and its proxy forces in the Middle East. 
Additional Support to Gulf Partners.  Coinciding with support to improve the 
Gulf’s missile defense capabilities aimed at deterring Iran, the United States can fund and 
support other critical elements of its security cooperation effort with the GCC.  For 
instance, the U.S. should pursue is provide additional funding and support for Foreign 
Military Sales (FMS) and International Military and Education Training (IMET) 
programs to the Gulf states.  These programs aimed at strengthening the capabilities of its 
Gulf partners have demonstrated their effectiveness in the past.   
For years, the U.S. has sold advanced military hardware to the Gulf to ensure that 
strategic threats in Iran and Syria cannot intimidate U.S. regional allies.  If the U.S. does 
pursue this option, it will have to be careful in assuring anything given to the Gulf states 
does not jeopardize America’s commitment to sustain Israel’s qualitative military 
edge.287  The U.S. has long put restrictions on the types of weapons that American 
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defense firms can sell to Arab nations.  If a future administration approved F-35 sales to 
the Gulf, which would probably be the UAE in the beginning, in three years or so, it 
would allow Israel to have access to the advanced aircraft and its technology long enough 
to maintain its military edge in the Middle East.  In addition, the U.S. could make Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE “major non-NATO” allies like Kuwait and Bahrain.  Placing this 
designation on a country grants a number of military advantages that are available only to 
NATO allies, but falls short of a defense pact that the GCC is calling for.   
Finally, the United States should continue to expand and alter, where necessary, 
its IMET programs with the GCC.  IMET provides training and education to students 
from allied and friendly nations to facilitate the development of important professional 
and personal relationships, which have proven to provide U.S. access and influence in a 
critical sector of society that often plays a pivotal role in supporting, or transitioning to, 
democratic governments.288  The trainings can focus on the areas of cooperation that were 
detailed in the joint statement by the U.S. and GCC during the Camp David Summit.  
However, IMET with Gulf partners also “should be updated to reflect the new strategic 
imperatives in the Middle East, with a more explicit discussion of topics such as 
diversifying the security services, police conduct, and civilian-military responses to 
domestic threats.”289   
To focus on countering the threats posed by Iran, the United States should 
collaborate with its Gulf allies to establish large-scale exercises that emphasize 
interoperability against asymmetric threats, such as terrorist or cyber-attacks, or other 
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tactics associated with hybrid warfare.  Additionally, the U.S. could assist the GCC 
states to develop outside centers of excellence for training, educating, and exercise 
activity that includes sending mixes of member country students and teams for outside 
military training and education.  Iran presents a strategic threat to U.S. regional allies in 
several areas, therefore, strengthening allies’ capabilities to defend and deter against 
Iranian aggression can enhance greater Gulf security.  Furthering IMET programs can 
produce longer-lasting ties and greater mutual respect between the U.S. and GCC than 
can be afforded through joint exercises and in-theater cooperation. 
In order to have these military assistance and training programs be an impactful 
tool in America’s strategy in the Middle East, the U.S. needs to understand how these 
programs can be successful levers of influence.  To do so, conducting greater analysis of 
how these programs best shape outcomes, including comparisons of particular packages 
of hard equipment, trainings and assistance, would usefully inform how FMF packages 
are designed.  Without understanding how the military assistance and training investment 
is directly shaping the decision-making by the militaries of U.S. Gulf allies and the 
civilians with whom they serve, it is difficult to use such programs strategically to 
advance U.S. national security interests.   
Secondly, the U.S. should develop an assessment to evaluate the changing quality 
and closeness of military to military (or civilian) relations between the U.S. and its 
regional allies.  This would enable policymakers to ensure the greatest return on the 
military assistance and training investment, in part by building deep military-to-military 
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relationships that are capable of enduring crises.290  Conducting studies on these 
initiatives aimed at supporting U.S. regional allies can provide Washington with a better 
understanding of how to effectively utilize these programs to bolster Gulf security. 
Other long-term opportunities to strengthen Middle East security and limit Iran’s 
destabilizing foreign policy in the region include developing a comprehensive security 
cooperation plan to shape the development of GCC naval forces and support innovative 
thinking and progressive public-private relationships in the GCC defense sector.291  To 
counter future aggression by Iran in the Gulf, the U.S. can sustain and deepen programs 
and exercises aimed at improving GCC naval capabilities, such as the recent International 
Mine Countermeasures Exercise.292  With Iran’s potential threat of mining the Strait of 
Hormuz if tensions were to escalate in the Arabian Gulf, providing American-led training 
in mine countermeasures and other naval tactics would display U.S. commitment to 
regional security and allow the GCC to take greater responsibility in future regional 
conflicts.   
The above mentioned programs to fund and support the GCC military capabilities 
can provide benefits for both the U.S. and its Gulf allies.  The United States is already 
cooperating with its regional partners through arms sales and training, but with the 
growing strategic threat of Iran, these programs need to be analyzed, expanded and 
directed at Iran’s destabilizing military posture.  Funding for these programs should be 
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driven by the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), as recommended in the 
President’s Fiscal Year 2016 Budget.293  The QDR states the U.S. will maintain a strong 
military posture in the region, while placing “more emphasis on building the capacity of 
our partners in order to complement our strong military presence in the region” working 
closely with our allies “to enhance key multilateral capabilities, including integrated air 
and missile defense, maritime security, and SOF.”294  Combined with an offshore balance 
approach, these military assistance and training programs can demonstrate America’s 
commitment to establishing long-term security in the Gulf region. 
  
Assuring U.S. Support for Israel’s Security  
Despite Israel’s denouncement of the JCPOA, the U.S. will have to continue to 
urge Israel to not take any unwarranted actions that could potentially dismantle the 
nuclear agreement or cause additional destabilization in the Middle East.  Israel was 
reportedly close to attacking Iran during the nuclear talks, therefore, it is even more 
important now for the U.S. to reassure its longtime ally that the deal will not weaken 
Israel’s security.295   
The U.S. should implement alliance-management efforts with the goal “to 
encourage Israeli adaptation to [the Iran nuclear deal]” that U.S. believes prevents all 
paths for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon.296  Developing such policies that include 
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confidence-building measures should address Israel’s uncertainty over the efficacy of the 
deal and thereby reduce the potential for unilateral Israeli actions.   
For instance, it is recommended that the United States increase Israel’s deterrence 
posture by cooperating on enhancing its missile defenses to defend against Iranian 
missiles.  The United States already maintains a strong defense relationship with Israel, 
where it has cooperated with Israel on missile defense programs such as Iron Dome, the 
David’s Sling Weapon System, and the Arrow Weapon System to create a multi-layered 
architecture designed to protect the Israeli people from varying types of missile threats.  
Washington should continue to appropriate funds to help improve the efficacy of these 
systems in order to ensure their capability to intercept missiles or rockets from Iran or its 
proxy groups, which may become more effective if Iran decides to further develop its 
missile capabilities with its sanctions relief.  The U.S. continues to show its support for a 
robust Israeli missile defense architecture, as it has already allocated over half a billion 
dollars the past two years toward U.S.-Israeli missile defense cooperation.297   
Additionally, the United States could use non-military assurances to build 
confidence in America’s commitment to Israeli security.  An example being the 
establishment of a regular high-level political and strategic dialogue with Israel to keep 
its leaders informed on the implementation of the nuclear agreement and share mutual 
concerns about broader regional security developments.  This dialogue could entail how 
the U.S. will use all tools, even the military option, to its disposal to catch Iran soon after 
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a violation, if Iran were to do so.  Then the U.S. would make it clear that it is prepared to 
“snap back sanctions” if Tehran violates the JCPOA.298 
Even if these potential confidence-building and security measures are 
implemented, the U.S. should be clear about its views on the actions that would 
undermine its interests.  Meaning, Washington should openly communicate that the 
United States will only support military action against Iran as a last resort.  The U.S. has 
achieved what many thought would never happen in finalizing a deal with Tehran, thus, 
any premature or unnecessary military action against Iran will likely cause more harm 
than good to Middle East security.  Because Israel is concerned over Iran’s commitment 
to the JCPOA, the U.S. must be fully prepared to punish Iran if it were to violate the 
agreement.  To continue America’s pledge to Israeli security, implementing the options 
listed above, while preventing Iran from cheating, can provide reliable assurances to the 
U.S.-Israeli strategic partnership.   
 
Conclusion 
Iran is rising as a nation gaining more influence and standing in the Middle East, 
while maintaining a nuclear program that is capable of producing material needed for 
nuclear weapons.  Because of Iran’s concealment of past nuclear activities, which some 
believe has a military component to it, the United States has stood “ready to exercise all 
options to make sure Iran does not build a nuclear weapon.”299   
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During the Obama administration, the approach toward Iran has been pressure 
tied with engagement.  Since President Obama was inaugurated in 2009, his 
administration has sought opportunities to engage with Iran through diplomacy.  In a 
video sent to the Iranian people two months after his inauguration, he stated, “[The U.S. 
and Iran] have serious differences that have grown over time.  My administration is now 
committed to diplomacy that addresses the full range of issues before us, and to pursuing 
constructive ties among the United States, Iran and the international community.”300      
Such diplomacy has resulted in a nuclear deal with Iran, which has put certain 
limitations on Iran’s nuclear program.  Finalizing the JCPOA does not end all of the 
Middle East’s problems, but it is a step forward.  However, the perception in Iran that 
Tehran defeated the U.S. by maintaining a nuclear program will need to be addressed in 
the near- and long-term.  Countering Iran’s hegemonic ambitions, which may embolden 
as a result of the nuclear deal, will be a part of the challenge to limit Iranian power and 
preserve America’s regional interests in the Middle East. 
To preserve a balance of power in the Middle East where no country’s military 
capabilities overwhelming outmatch those of others in the region, the U.S. must develop 
a strategy that includes burden-sharing with regional allies, along with enhancing the 
military capabilities of those allies to strengthen their ability to secure the region.  With 
its Middle East allies, the U.S. must find ways to assure them that the nuclear deal will 
not embolden Iran’s destabilizing activities and threaten their security.  Whether that be 
through foreign military sales and training or increasing U.S. naval presence in the Gulf, 
                                                 
300 “Obama Reaches out to Iran via Video.” MSNBC. 20 Mar. 2009. http://www.nbcnews.com/id/29785710/ns/politics-
white_house/t/obama-reaches-out-iran-video/#.VLSRESvF_ng. 
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the U.S. should portray itself as a global power who is willing to protect its interests and 
partners in the Middle East.   
However, Washington will have to do so by adapting to the current global 
environment.  The U.S. should adopt the economy of force principle,301 as stated in the 
U.S. Defense Strategy Review: “Whenever possible, [the U.S.] will develop innovative, 
low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on 
exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities” with the warning that “with 
reduced resources, thoughtful choices will need to be made regarding the location and 
frequency of these operations.”302  It should be noted that a smaller footprint should 
include a stronger U.S. maritime presence in the Gulf region to maintain America’s 
commitment to its regional allies by countering violent extremism and destabilizing 
threats.  Developing the defense capabilities of Gulf allies, while implementing the role 
as an offshore balancer, would allow the U.S. to actively engage in a Middle East conflict 
only when the balance of power and American interests are in jeopardy, while gradually 
building the militaries of its regional allies to form a balance to contain hostile forces like 
Iran and its allies.  
Placing more responsibility of regional security on America’s Middle East allies 
has several gains.  It will allow Middle East states to demonstrate their ability to protect 
for themselves against state and non-state actors, which will provide long-term security 
despite what America’s footprint is in the region.  Also, more burden-sharing could 
reduce the potential for an opponent to mount multiple small provocations designed to 
                                                 
301 Economy of force is one of Carl von Clausewitz’s nine “Principles of War” that involves employing all available 
combat power in the most effective way possible, in an attempt to allocate a minimum of essential combat power to any 
secondary efforts.  
302 “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense.” U.S. Department of Defense. Page 3. Jan. 
2012. http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf. 
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force the United States repeatedly into expensive operations to augment forward-
deployed forces, or what was known as the cheat-and-retreat tactic used by Saddam 
Hussein during the 1990s. 
In regards to Israel, the U.S. should continue to assure its commitment to 
preserving the security of Israel.  Israel is America’s most important strategic ally in the 
Middle East and it should implement additional confidence-building and security 
measures.  Continuing military-to-military cooperation with Israel, specifically towards 
Israeli’s missile defenses, and enhancing political and strategic dialogue between the U.S. 
and Israel can demonstrate America’s continued commitment in maintaining a strong 
alliance with Israel.  
Throughout the Middle East, the United States should preserve its strategic 
interests while looking for opportunities to improve the region’s crises in a post-JCPOA 
world.  The United States has demonstrated its national power in the past in the Middle 
East through unilateral and multilateral actions and should continue to do so in an 
evolving security environment that involves a more influential Iran and more 
responsibility of GCC states.  To counter Iran’s destabilizing regional goals and 
influence, it is necessary for the United States to remind the theocracy in Tehran that the 
U.S. remains committed to protecting its interests and allies in the Middle East to ensure 
long-term regional security. 
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